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With a view to better understanding the optimal structure of financial 
regulation, this paper tests prevailing theoretical hypotheses respecting the 
efficiency and overall desirability of integrated financial regulation 
relative to competing institutional models.  This test is conducted through 
the lens of a comparative case study examining the approaches adopted by 
(fragmented) U.S financial regulators and the (integrated) U.K. Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) toward the myriad of regulatory challenges posed 
by the emergence, growth, and systemic importance of over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives markets.  More specifically, this paper examines why, 
despite the numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, the 
FSA adopted a non-interventionist regulatory regime governing OTC 
derivatives markets which was both functionally equivalent to the 
fragmented U.S. regime and, arguably, socially sub-optimal.  This paper 
argues that the FSA‟s approach to the regulation of OTC derivatives 
markets may potentially be explained on the basis of a combination of (1) 
poor coordination, (2) the FSA‟s attempts to balance competing regulatory 
objectives, (3) incentive problems which arise for national regulators in the 
context of global financial markets, and (4) the inherent limitations of 
financial regulation.  Each of these potential explanations holds important 
insights for the ongoing debate respecting the optimal structure of 
regulation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The past three decades have been characterized by seismic changes in 
the structure of global financial markets.  These changes have sparked a 
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pronounced shift in many jurisdictions toward greater integration of the 
public institutions responsible for financial regulation.  This shift has been 
fueled by a perceived need for the structure of regulation to reflect the 
increasing integration, globalization, and complexity of financial markets 
themselves.  Conspicuously, the momentum toward more integrated 
financial regulation has historically been met with resistance in the United 
States (U.S.), where responsibility has long been split between a cacophony 
of federal regulators including the Federal Reserve Board, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).  More 
recently, however, lawmakers, regulators, and pundits—including the 
Obama Administration itself
2
—have criticized the ―gaps,‖
3
 ―weaknesses,‖
4
 
and ―loopholes‖
5
 manifest within this fractured regulatory framework as 
having contributed to the market and regulatory failures that precipitated 
the global financial crisis.
6
  Many of these criticisms, if not for the recently 
enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act), have been accompanied by calls for regulatory reform 
founded upon the perceived superiority of integrated regulation.
7
 
In evaluating the merits of these proposals for structural reform, U.S. 
policymakers would be well advised to look across the Atlantic to draw 
lessons from the experiences—and criticisms
8
—of the integrated regulator 
that many observers, not so very long ago, considered the blueprint for the 
 
 2. See U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at  
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (explaining the weakness 
of current approaches to financial regulation and suggesting a number of reforms). 
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. See, e.g., Ashok Vir Bhatia, Andrea Maechler & Paul Mills, Strategic Priorities for 
the Reform of U.S. Financial Regulation, compiled in Int‘l Monetary Fund [IMF], United 
States: Selected Issues, at 28, IMF Country Report No. 09/229 (July 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=23145.0 (follow ―Free Full Text‖ 
hyperlink) (enumerating several instances in which the Treasury‘s new regulatory 
framework leaves unresolved problems surrounding cross-agency implementation). 
 7. See, e.g., THE COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN 
FOR REGULATORY REFORM (2009), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-
CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf (setting forth a plan for regulatory reform to address the 
deficiencies in the current system exposed by the financial crisis). 
 8. See, e.g., Laurence Norman & Natasha Brereton, U.K. Regulator Defends Its Role – 
Conservatives Would Scrap FSA, Divide Its Duties; Creating a Lame Duck?, WALL ST. J., 
July 21, 2009 (describing the FSA‘s defense of its regulatory model to Conservative Party 
threats); Rowena Mason, MPs Blame „Impotent‟ FSA Over Icelandic Banks, TELEGRAPH, 
Apr. 4, 2009 (describing the FSA‘s failure to act on strong warnings that Icelandic bank 
Kaupthing was not capable of running a U.K. business); and Tories Target U.K. Market 
Regulator, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009 (describing the Conservative Party‘s stance towards 
the FSA). 
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future of financial regulation:  the now ill-fated United Kingdom (U.K.) 
Financial Services Authority (FSA).  Amongst the wide ranging criticisms 
of the FSA stemming from the global financial crisis has been that the 
U.K.‘s unified financial services watchdog failed to regulate over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives
9
 markets effectively.  OTC derivatives—
financial instruments, the value of which are derived from (hence the 
name) another asset commonly referred to as the ‗underlying‘
10
—have in 
recent years emerged from relative obscurity to exert a profound influence 
on global financial markets.  On the eve of the crisis, the outstanding 
notional value
11
 of all OTC derivatives stood at over USD$516 trillion,
12
 up 
from USD$80 trillion
13
 less than a decade earlier, and several times the 
global (M3) money supply.  The growth and proliferation of OTC 
derivatives have also generated complex, systemically significant 
relationships between derivative, underlying, and related markets.  
However, despite their explosive growth and systemic importance—to say 
nothing of the foreshadowing provided by the derivatives-related collapses 
of, amongst others, Barings PLC, Orange County, and Long Term Capital 
Management—OTC derivatives markets remained, prior to the crisis, 
effectively (if not always legally)
14
 outside the perimeter of financial 
regulation in every major financial center.  The relative dearth of public 
regulatory intervention into these markets can be explained in many 
jurisdictions, at least in part, with reference to pre-existing institutional 
 
 9. The term OTC is used to denote those derivatives which do not trade on an 
organized or regulated exchange. 
 10. All derivatives are engineered from two basic financial building blocks:  options 
and forwards.  These building blocks can be combined in an infinite number of ways and 
with reference to an infinite number of underlying, thus facilitating the truly stunning 
diversity of instruments observed within OTC derivatives markets.  See Ed Murray, UK 
Financial Derivatives and Commodities Markets, in FINANCIAL MARKETS & EXCHANGES 
LAW 265-300 (Michael Blair & George Walker eds., 2007).  Given this diversity, it is 
perhaps not surprising that different types of OTC derivatives (bilateral swaps versus 
securitizations for example) may manifest different risks and, accordingly, pose different 
regulatory challenges.  As will become apparent, the purpose of this paper is not to delve 
into the decidedly complex task of identifying the specific risks associated with each species 
of OTC derivative or the optimal regulatory response. 
 11. While illuminative of the size and growth of OTC derivatives markets, notional 
value—effectively the benchmark against which cash flows are calculated in the context of 
OTC derivatives transactions—is effectively a second-best proxy for their market value 
(which, from an accounting perspective, nets out at zero for bilateral instruments). 
 12. BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 24 (Dec. 2007) (presenting 
figures as of June 2007).  The outstanding notional value of all OTC derivatives peaked at 
over USD$683 trillion in June 2008, just three months before Lehman Bros. announced that 
it was filling for bankruptcy protection.  BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY 
REVIEW 32 (Dec. 2008). 
 13. BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 32 (Nov. 2000) (presenting 
figures as of December 1998). 
 14. As we shall see, OTC derivatives fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the FSA. 
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pathologies.  Most infamously, the 35-year long dispute between the SEC 
and CFTC has been frequently identified as a source of chronic regulatory 
failure.
15
  But what about the FSA?  What about integrated regulation? 
The purpose of this paper is to examine why, despite radically 
different institutional models (to say nothing of the perceived theoretical 
superiority of integrated regulation), financial regulators in the U.K. and 
U.S. generated functionally equivalent regulatory regimes governing OTC 
derivatives markets.  The answer to this question in turn manifests 
potentially important implications for a broader question:  Does the 
institutional structure of financial regulation matter?  These questions will 
be examined through the lens of a historical and substantive comparison of 
the pre-crisis regulatory regimes governing OTC derivatives markets in 
both the U.S. and U.K.  This inquiry yields three related contributions to 
the scholarly and public policy debates concerning the optimal structure of 
financial regulation.  First, it tests prevailing theoretical hypotheses 
respecting the strengths and weaknesses of integrated regulation against the 
real world regulation—and regulatory outcomes—generated by regulators.  
Perhaps most importantly in this respect, insofar as the relevant scholarly 
and public policy debates have thus far centered around its potential 
efficacy within particular political or market contexts, the orientation of 
this inquiry in terms of examining the effectiveness of integrated regulation 
in response to a specific and pressing regulatory challenge is both novel 
and, as we shall see, illuminating.  Second, this exploration builds 
incrementally upon our still-fledgling understanding of the institutional 
pre-conditions (and other potential impediments) to the effectiveness of 
integrated regulation.  Finally, and more broadly, this exploration generates 
potentially valuable insights respecting both the incentive problems that 
arise in the context of the national regulation of global financial markets 
and the inherent limitations of regulation within highly complex and 
dynamic environments.  Each of these contributions manifest potentially 
important lessons for policymakers seeking to identify the optimal structure 
of financial regulation. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Part II provides a foundation for the 
present inquiry by canvassing the theoretical arguments both for and 
against integrated regulation.  Part III begins by stating the case for why 
OTC derivatives markets represent a compelling case study within the 
context of the present inquiry.  The remainder of Part III is then dedicated 
to a historical and substantive comparison of the pre-crisis regulatory 
regimes governing OTC derivatives markets in the U.S. and U.K.  Drawing 
upon these foundations, Part IV explores potential explanations for the 
FSA‘s non-interventionist approach toward the regulation of OTC 
 
 15. See infra Part III(b). 
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derivatives markets and examines what lessons we can draw from these 
explanations in terms of the optimal institutional structure of financial 
regulation and, more broadly, its limitations. 
II.  INTEGRATED FINANCIAL REGULATION:  A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
A. Integrated Regulation Defined 
Recent decades have witnessed a pronounced shift toward greater 
integration of financial regulation.
16
  Evidence of this shift can be observed 
in jurisdictions with such diverse financial and political systems as 
Germany, Japan, Thailand, Iceland, Estonia, and—before the recently 
announced break-up of the FSA
17
—the U.K.
18
  However, for all the 
attention surrounding this shift, the various manifestations of integrated 
regulation have not yet coalesced—either in theory or practice—around a 
single institutional model.  Broadly speaking, and for the purposes of this 
paper, integrated regulation refers to the integration of:  (1) rule-making, 
supervision, and enforcement of prudential
19
 and conduct of business
20
 
(and, potentially, consumer protection) regulation;
21
 and (2) regulation 
governing each of the banking, securities (including investment 
management), and insurance industries.
22
  It must be observed, however, 
 
 16. See, e.g., Martin Cihak & Richard Podpiera, Is One Watchdog Better Than Three?  
International Experience with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision at 3-4 (IMF Working 
Paper No. 06/57, 2006) (presenting a cross-country analysis of experiences with integrated 
financial supervision). 
 17. See David Enrich & Laurence Norman, U.K. Shakes Up Its Bank Regulation, WALL 
ST. J., June 17, 2010, at C1 (describing the elimination of the FSA and the consolidation of 
power within the Bank of England) and George Parker & Brooke Masters, Osborne 
Abolishes FSA and Boosts Bank, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 2010 (describing the FSA‘s 
elimination and the Bank of England‘s consolidation of power).  The proposal contemplates 
that the FSA will be brought under the umbrella of the Bank of England and split into two 
(and potentially more) regulators:  one responsible for micro-prudential regulation of 
financial institutions, and the other for overseeing consumer protection and markets. 
 18. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 6-7 (canvassing the broad range of institutional 
models exhibited within various countries). 
 19. The objective of prudential regulation is generally to manage risk within financial 
markets. Micro-prudential regulation refers to regulation aimed at managing risks (i.e. 
insolvency risk) to individual financial institutions, while macro-prudential regulation is 
aimed at managing systemic risks to the financial system. 
 20. The objective of conduct of business regulation is, broadly speaking, to ensure fair 
dealing between market participants. 
 21. Conspicuous in their absence from this list of functions are the monetary policy 
functions typically performed by central banks.  While these functions clearly represent an 
integral aspect of financial regulation, to the extent that the integration of monetary policy 
and other regulatory functions manifest a largely distinct set of issues, and are not directly 
relevant in terms of the regulation of OTC derivatives, they reside beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 22. Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 5. 
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that integrated regulators will frequently manifest important differences in 
terms of their regulatory objectives, supervisory responsibilities, 
enforcement powers, and jurisdictional scope.
23
  These differences will, in 
turn, affect the extent to which a particular regulatory regime will be able 
to translate the theoretical advantages of integrated regulation into practice. 
The theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation 
canvassed in Part II(b) are perhaps best understood when integrated 
regulation is itself compared alongside its principal institutional 
competitors:  the institutional, functional, and objectives–based models of 
financial regulation.
24
  As described in Table 1.1, each of these competing 
models is premised on the existence of multiple specialist regulators.  The 
institutional model contemplates the allocation of responsibility amongst 
specialist regulators on the basis of distinctions between particular species 
of financial institutions (i.e. banks, brokerage firms, or insurance 
companies), irrespective of the specific lines of business or activities 
individual institutions actually pursue.
25
  Conversely, the functional model 
allocates responsibility on the basis of distinctions between specific lines of 
business or activities.
26
  The functional model thus contemplates, for 
example, that a single specialist regulator might enjoy jurisdiction over the 
regulation of mortgage financing activities across all types of financial 
institutions.  As Charles Goodhart et al. observe, the distinction between 
the institutional and functional models may prove insignificant where the 
activities of financial institutions are primarily focused within particular 
segments of the financial services industry.
27
  Where, however, financial 
institutions are engaged in activities across multiple industry segments, the 
distinction between these competing institutional models becomes 
simultaneously more meaningful and more complex. 
The third principal institutional competitor of integrated regulation is 
the objectives-based model.  As its name implies, objectives-based 
regulation divides responsibility between specialist regulators on the basis 
of specific regulatory objectives.  Goodhart et al., for example, have 
 
 23. Jose de Luna Martinez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated 
Financial Sector Supervision (World Bank, Working Paper 3096, 2003) (describing the 
results of a survey of fifteen countries that have adopted integrated supervision). 
 24. A number of potential variations of these basic institutional models—most notably 
those based on unified oversight boards and/or support functions—have been advanced.  For 
a discussion of these variations, see Richard K. Abrams & Michael W. Taylor, Issues in the 
Unification of Financial Sector Supervision 22 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/00/213, 2000) 
(discussing the possible composition, purposes, and limitations of unified oversight boards). 
 25. CHARLES GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE 
NOW? 144 (Routledge 1998). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  Thus, for example, banks as an institution are primarily engaged in the function 
of providing commercial banking and deposit-taking services. 
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articulated an objectives-based model premised on six objectives:  systemic 
risk; non-systemic prudential; retail conduct of business; wholesale conduct 
of business; financial exchange; and competition regulation.
28
  A second 
subspecies is the so-called ―twin peaks‖ model.
29
  The twin peaks model 
contemplates two regulators:  one responsible for prudential supervision 
and the other for conduct of business regulation, consumer protection, and 
corporate governance.  The division of responsibilities between the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is an example of this 
model.  Ultimately, as with integrated regulation, manifestations of each of 
these models vary widely in practice and—as illustrated by the current 
patchwork regulatory regime governing the U.S. financial services 
industry—may even be pursued concurrently.
30
 
 
TABLE 1.1: INTEGRATED REGULATION AND ITS PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITORS 
Institutional Model Number of 
Regulators 
Basis for Allocating 
Responsibility Amongst 
Regulators 
Examples 
Integrated Regulation 
 
One n/a U.K. (current), 
Germany, 
Japan 
Institutional Regulation Multiple The species of financial 
institution (i.e. bank, brokerage 
firm, insurance company, 
investment fund, etc.) 
U.S., Canada 
Functional Regulation Multiple The lines of business or 
activities pursued (i.e. 
commercial banking, 
investment banking, retail 
brokerage, proprietary trading, 
investment management, life 
insurance, pensions, mortgage 
financing, etc.) 
U.S., Canada 
Objectives-based 
Regulation 
Multiple Identified regulatory objectives 
(i.e. prudential, conduct of 
business, consumer protection). 
U.K. 
(proposed), 
Australia, U.S. 
 
 28. Id. at 159. 
 29. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS: A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE NEW 
CENTURY (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 1995) (describing the twin peaks 
model). 
 30. The author was thwarted in his attempts to identify a single jurisdiction that 
employed a regulatory structure premised exclusively on either the institutional or functional 
approaches. 
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There are those who view the structure of financial regulation as a 
second-order issue.
31
  Pursuant to this view, the key determinants of 
regulatory efficiency and effectiveness are not related to institutional 
design, but are, rather, attributable to such variables as independence, 
accountability, articulation of clear regulatory objectives, allocation of 
sufficient financial and human capital, and effective enforcement powers.
32
  
However, as illustrated in greater detail below, it is perhaps more accurate 
(and useful) to envision these variables as being intermingled with issues of 
institutional design.
33
  Furthermore, to the extent that institutional design 
plays a role in determining the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation, it 
is clearly important in its own right.
34
  We begin our examination, 
therefore, by canvassing the primary sources of theoretical support for 
integrated regulation. 
B. Principal Theoretical Support 
The shift toward integrated regulation has taken place within an 
environment characterized by two broad trends:  (1) the increasing 
international mobility of capital and the resulting globalization of 
competition within the financial services industry; and (2) the integration of 
banking, securities, and insurance markets.
35
  These trends have generated 
complex linkages within and between financial markets and blurred 
historical distinctions between many markets and instruments.
36
  The 
widespread use of securitization, for example, has both strengthened and 
rendered more complex the relationship between traditional commercial 
banking and capital markets.  Many credit derivatives, meanwhile, exhibit 
 
 31. Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 3. 
 32. Id. at 6-9. 
 33. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 8. 
 34. Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Regulator, 2 FSA 
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, May 1999, at 5 (exploring whether, independent of the financial 
services regulated firms provide, there exists an optimal regulatory structure for the 
financial services industry). 
 35. See Arthur Wilmarth, The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 passim 
(2002) (providing a detailed account of the emergence of financial conglomerates and 
arguing that current regulatory policies are inadequate for the purpose of policing them); 
Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 8-11 (discussing the supervision of financial 
conglomerates and competitive neutrality as justifications for regulatory integration); 
GOODHART ET AL., supra note 25, at 142-144 (arguing that, inter alia, increasing 
internationalization has implications for institutional structure of financial regulation); 
Briault, supra note 34, at 12 (discussing how increased internationalization and competition 
has blurred the traditional distinctions separating types of financial products and firms); 
Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing integrated regulation as a response to the 
integration of banking, securities and insurance markets). 
 36. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 3. 
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characteristics of securities, insurance, and debt instruments.
37
  The 
ongoing globalization and integration of financial markets
38
 has made the 
gathering and analysis of market information by, and coordination 
amongst, financial regulators simultaneously more vital to the delivery of 
effective regulation, more complex, and, ultimately, more costly.  It is 
within the context of such complex and dynamic global financial markets 
that the theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation most 
strongly resonate.  Broadly speaking, these arguments are premised upon 
the potential of integrated regulation to generate economies of scale and 
scope and thereby reduce the coordination, information and other 
transaction costs of regulation relative to institutional models 
contemplating a multiplicity of regulators. 
The most prominent theoretical argument in support of integrated 
regulation is that it enables regulators to adopt more comprehensive or 
holistic approaches toward financial regulation, in essence reflecting the 
trends toward the globalization and integration of financial markets.
39
  This 
potential derives from two primary sources.  First, the integration of market 
surveillance, registrant, compliance, disclosure, reporting, and other 
information systems facilitates the aggregation of data across a broader 
range of sources,
40
 generating an economy of scope equal to the resulting 
reduction in coordination costs relative to systems characterized by 
multiple regulators.
41
  To the extent that regulators are thereby able to build 
a more complete picture (and understanding) of various risks within and 
across firms, markets, and the financial system, one would expect the 
aggregation of these systems to contribute still further toward the 
fulfillment of regulatory objectives.  Second, the integration of 
management functions within a single regulator manifests the potential to 
break down institutional barriers to effective communication and 
cooperation, thus reducing the coordination costs associated with, for 
 
 37. Briault, supra note 34, at 14. 
 38. A process which, while perhaps slowed by the global financial crisis, has by no 
means ceased. 
 39. Briault, supra note 34, at 12-17; Eilís Ferran, Examining the U.K.‟s Experience in 
Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 257, 277 (2003); 
Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 3.  In a survey conducted by Martinez and Rose, 
fourteen out of fifteen respondent countries identified this issue as factoring into their 
decision to move toward integrated regulation.  Martinez & Rose, supra note 23, at 9.  See 
also Her Majesty‘s Treasury [H.M. Treasury], Financial Services and Markets Bill: A 
Consultation Document.  Part One.  Overview of Financial Regulatory Reform, at 8, H.M. 
Treasury Press Release (July 1998) (presenting comments from former U.K. Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Gordon Brown on the announcement of the creation of the FSA). 
 40. Briault, supra note 34, at 18; Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 13-14; Cihak & 
Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9. 
 41. Within which regulators would presumably need to negotiate and implement 
information-sharing mechanisms in order to achieve the same level of aggregation. 
AWREYFINALIZED_ONE 1/5/2011  10:27 PM 
10 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
example, (1) the development and articulation of clear and coherent 
regulatory mandates, (2) the generation of integrated legal and regulatory 
frameworks which are both competitively neutral and free of gaps,
42
 (3) the 
evaluation and prioritization of risks, and (4) the allocation of scarce 
regulatory resources toward where they are likely to yield the greatest 
social benefits.
43
 
Integrated regulation, its proponents assert, thus facilitates the 
adoption of a broader, more comprehensive, and more nuanced regulatory 
outlook across firms, markets, and the financial system, ultimately with the 
objective of identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing risks and taking 
coordinated regulatory action.  It is frequently argued, for example, that 
integrated regulators possess a comparative advantage with respect to the 
monitoring of financial conglomerates
44
 insofar as they are better 
positioned to ensure that these firms (1) are adequately capitalized across 
their various lines of business, and (2) have put in place sufficient 
organization-wide risk management systems.
45
  It is similarly argued that 
integrated regulators are better positioned to address cross-sectoral and 
industry-wide issues such as money laundering, financing of terrorism, 
consumer education, and, importantly for the present purposes, the 
regulation of OTC derivatives markets.
46
  On the same basis, integrated 
regulators find themselves, in theory, better positioned to understand and 
address potential systemic risks.
47
 
A second, and related, source of theoretical support for integrated 
regulation flows from the hypothesis that the lower information and 
coordination costs derived from the integration of information systems and 
management functions enable integrated regulators to more swiftly and 
effectively identify, evaluate, and respond to the emergence of new 
regulatory challenges.
48
  This hypothesis proceeds broadly as follows.  
First, to the extent that integrated regulators are engaged in market 
surveillance across all firms and markets, they are, in theory, more likely to 
observe new market developments.
49
  Second, once these developments 
 
 42. Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 11; Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9; and 
Martinez & Rose, supra note 22, at 7-8. 
 43. Ferran, supra note 39, at 284.  This is precisely the premise underlying the FSA‘s 
―risk-based‖ approach to regulation. 
 44. Firms operating across the full spectrum of financial markets. 
 45. Briault, supra note 34, at 14; Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 10.  This 
argument may be less persuasive with respect to jurisdictions with smaller or less advanced 
financial markets.  Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24. 
 46. Clive Briault, Revisiting the Rationale for a Single National Financial Regulator, 
16 FSA OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, Feb. 2002, at 6, 19-21. 
 47. Martinez & Rose, supra note 23, at 2, 7. 
 48. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9. 
 49. There exists a potentially persuasive counterargument that specialist regulators are, 
owing to the narrower, more focused scope of their jurisdiction, more likely to identify 
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have come to light, integrated regulators (given their holistic outlook) are 
also more likely to appreciate the full nature and extent of both the 
attendant risks as well as the likely impact of regulatory (in)action.  Indeed, 
one would expect this to be particularly true for developments which 
transcend historical distinctions between financial institutions and markets 
or, perhaps more to the point, jurisdictional boundaries between multiple 
specialist regulators.  Finally, where a regulatory response to a particular 
market development is required, integrated regulators are likely to incur 
lower transaction costs
50
 in connection with the design and implementation 
of regulatory action
51
 relative to the more complex—and likely 
politicized—process of doing so within a regime characterized by multiple 
regulators. 
The third principal theoretical argument in support of integrated 
regulation is that it imbues integrated regulators with de facto 
accountability.  This argument proceeds from the observation that, relative 
to a system characterized by a multiplicity of competing regulators with 
potentially overlapping jurisdictions, the opportunity for integrated 
regulators to shift the blame for regulatory failures is effectively 
foreclosed.
52
  Proponents argue that this generates strong incentives for 
integrated regulators to articulate clear mandates, to pursue these mandates 
vigorously, and to instill within market participants clear expectations 
about the nature and level of regulatory protection they will receive.
53
  
Perhaps more importantly, high levels of de facto accountability contribute 
(along with mechanisms which ensure sufficient de jure accountability) to 
the amelioration of concerns, discussed in Part II(c), that integrated 
regulators may be particularly susceptible to abuses of power and 
regulatory capture. 
Proponents frequently advance several other, arguably secondary, 
theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation premised on the 
generation of economies of scale and/or scope.  It is often asserted, for 
example, that insofar as they represent a ―one-stop shop,‖
54
 integrated 
 
emerging regulatory issues within their purview.  However, given the blurring of traditional 
distinctions between institutions, markets, and financial instruments, both institutional and 
functional regulators are, arguably, increasingly likely to exhibit a form of regulatory 
myopia insofar as their limited purview may constrain them from observing all of the 
information necessary to fully appreciate the emergence or significance of a particular issue. 
 50. Including, importantly in many cases, time. 
 51. Including any related internal reallocation of regulatory resources and/or 
responsibility. 
 52. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 25, at 152; Ferran, supra note 39, at 295; Abrams 
and Taylor, supra note 23, at 12, 15; Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 10.  Once again, 
this is a consequence of the lower coordination costs flowing from the integration of 
management functions within a single regulator. 
 53. Ferran, supra note 39, at 295. 
 54. Id. at 279. 
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regulators generate transaction cost savings for both regulated firms (who 
need only deal with a single point of regulatory contact) and consumers 
(who are spared the potentially daunting prospect of having to navigate 
through an alphabet soup of regulators in order to acquire information or 
lodge a complaint).  It has also been argued that the scale enjoyed by 
integrated regulators enables them to pursue large infrastructure 
investments, such as new market surveillance or information technology, 
which might be cost prohibitive for smaller specialist regulators.
55
  Finally, 
it has been observed that the reduced coordination costs flowing from the 
integration of management functions within a single regulator provide 
integrated regulators a comparative advantage in terms of their ability to 
pursue effective human resources strategies.
56
  Given the importance of 
developing and retaining human capital as a necessary pre-condition to the 
generation of effective public policy—especially in the context of complex, 
rapidly evolving global financial markets—this comparative advantage, if 
realized, might very well prove significant. 
C. A Critical Perspective 
The theoretical arguments in support of integrated regulation provoke 
three species of response from its critics.
57
  First, critics argue that 
integrated regulators face a host of potential challenges in connection with 
the extraction of the theoretical economies of scale and scope described 
above.   Second, they argue that the integration of management functions 
may generate negative consequences in terms of diminished accountability 
and the sub-optimal balancing of competing regulatory objectives.  Finally, 
critics advance that integrated regulation is itself sub-optimal to the extent 
that integrated regulators are, by their very nature, incapable of harnessing 
the potential benefits of regulatory competition.  This third argument 
deserves particular attention because it is the only one of the three species 
 
 55. Abrams and Taylor, supra note 23, at 13; Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 9. 
 56. Abrams and Taylor, supra note 23, at 14.  Specifically, integrated regulators may be 
better positioned to offer their personnel more varied and challenging opportunities, along 
with tailored internal training programs and career planning services.  Id. 
 57. A fourth response, not examined here, is that the transition costs of migrating 
toward an integrated regulatory model (for those jurisdictions presently employing multiple 
specialist regulators) are likely to outweigh any savings generated by the information, 
coordination, or other transaction costs of regulation.  These potential transition costs 
include those stemming from (1) the loss of key personnel and, as a result, human capital 
and institutional memory; (2) mismanagement of the integration process; (3) the prospect 
that the process will be captured by special interests; and (4) the integration of potentially 
divergent organizational and regulatory cultures.  Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority [APRA], Report to Messrs Corrs Chambers Westgarth from John Palmer, FCA, 
APRA Doc. S/1473964/1, § 5.5.2 (July 15, 2002); Taylor and Abrams, supra note 24, at 16; 
Cihak and Podpiera, supra note 16, at 11. 
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of response that can be viewed as providing a measure of positive 
theoretical support for institutional models characterized by multiple 
regulators.  I begin, therefore, by examining the case for regulatory 
competition. 
The salutary and deleterious effects of regulatory competition have 
been the subject of intense debate for decades.
58
  Proponents of regulatory 
competition argue that competitive pressures within a system characterized 
by multiple regulators will enhance innovation, choice, and efficiency, and 
ultimately result in the optimal level of regulatory intervention into 
 
 58. The theory of regulatory competition has perhaps most frequently been advanced 
(and rebuked) within the context of inter-state (including European Union) competition for 
corporate charters and, to a lesser extent, the dual (federal/state regulated) banking system in 
the United States.  See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the 
Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002) 
(arguing that competition among states for corporate charters through regulation generates 
undesirable incentives); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) 
(discussing the potential pitfalls of competition among states for corporate charters); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (examining whether there 
is still competition for corporate charters among states); Roberta Romano, Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) 
(analyzing state competition for corporate charters); Roberta Romano, The State 
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987) (discussing 
Delaware‘s success in the regulatory competition for corporate charters); Roberta Romano, 
The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006) (examining the legal innovation in corporate law 
among competing states). 
  The theory has also been advanced (and, again, rebuked) within the context of 
securities laws and, specifically, issuer disclosure laws.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & 
Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital 
Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997) (analyzing the potential for international 
competition within the field of securities regulation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition 
Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and 
Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. L.J. 447, 448 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Competition Versus 
Consolidation] (analyzing the merits of regulatory competition in the context of securities 
regulation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings 
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757 (2002) (discussing the benefits of regulatory competition in the field of issuer 
disclosure); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice 
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure] (arguing against an ―issuer choice‖ system of competitive 
securities regulation); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalized Market: Who 
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997) (discussing regulation of 
transnational transactions in corporate equities); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, 
Empowering Investors] (proposing a competitive, market-oriented approach to securities 
regulation); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) (comparing competitive issuer 
disclosure regulation with competitive state corporate regulation). 
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privately ordered markets.  Implicit within this line of reasoning is the 
conviction that, by generating incentives for regulators to avoid poor 
decision-making, regulatory competition can act as an antidote to potential 
behavioral biases.
59
  It is similarly argued that, insofar as multiple 
regulators are able to give voice to a broader range of constituencies that 
might otherwise find themselves marginalized by an integrated regulator, 
regulatory competition represents something of a safeguard against both 
potential abuses of power and regulatory capture.
60
  In these latter two 
respects, the case for regulatory competition can be seen as addressing 
concerns, discussed in greater detail below, that an integrated regulator 
may exhibit characteristics of a monopolistic ―regulatory leviathan.‖  
Indeed, the potential to constrain the actions of self-interested mega-
regulators represents perhaps the most significant theoretical benefit of 
regulatory competition in this context.
61
 
Ultimately, however, the case for regulatory competition (and with it 
the positive case for institutional models premised on multiple regulators) 
is riddled with theoretical and practical shortcomings.  First, there exists a 
threshold question as to precisely how a competitive environment will 
materialize within a system characterized by multiple regulators, each 
operating within clearly defined and mutually exclusive areas of 
responsibility.  Within such an environment, it would be reasonable to 
expect regulatory ―products‖ to exhibit low price elasticities, thus 
constraining the possibility of welfare enhancing regulatory arbitrage.  
What this suggests, perhaps surprisingly, is that regulatory competition 
within such systems requires a significant level of jurisdictional ambiguity 
and/or overlap in order to generate a market for regulation.  However, as 
amply illustrated by the U.S. experience regulating OTC derivatives 
markets described in Part III, such ambiguity and/or overlap provides 
fertile ground for inter-agency turf wars, potentially resulting in regulatory 
systems perceived by market participants as unduly complex, uncertain, 
unresponsive, and costly.
62
 
 
 59. Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market, 16 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 111, 112, 117-118 (2002) [hereinafter Choi, Channeling Competition]; 
Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 58, at 2365. 
 60. Coffee, Competition Versus Consolidation, supra note 58, at 454; Roberta S. 
Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United 
States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 495, 544 (2003). 
 61. Choi, Channeling Competition, supra note 59, at 112. 
 62. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK‘S AND 
THE US‘S GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 15-17, 62, 65, 78 (2007) [hereinafter 
Bloomberg Report], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL116000pub/materials/library/NY_Schumer-
Bloomberg_REPORT_FINAL.pdf; Coffee, Competition Versus Consolidation, supra note 
58, at 465. 
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Furthermore, unlike regulatory competition for corporate charters 
within a federal system
63
 (where regulated actors may enjoy a significant 
degree of mobility and, thus, choice), the prospect of vibrant inter-
jurisdictional (if not necessarily intra-jurisdictional, inter-regulator) 
competition for financial regulation is undermined by the reality that 
financial institutions will, generally speaking,
64
 find themselves subject to 
the applicable regulatory regimes in each jurisdiction in which they 
conduct business.  Accordingly, the potential gains from regulatory 
arbitrage are, arguably, likely to be outweighed in many instances by the 
desire to access domestic financial markets—especially those of large, 
strategically important jurisdictions such as the U.S. and U.K. 
A second shortcoming of the case for regulatory competition is the 
apparent blind spot it manifests with respect to the negative externalities 
associated with pervasive regulatory arbitrage.
65
  It seems reasonable to 
suggest that the benefits derived from regulatory competition will flow 
primarily
66
 to (1) the financial institutions which engage in regulatory 
arbitrage and (2) the regulators who offer the most competitive legal and 
regulatory frameworks.  At the same time, however, and as vividly 
evidenced by the fallout from the global financial crisis, the costs of 
regulatory failure within a globally integrated financial system are all too 
often borne by a far broader cross-section of society.  On the basis of this 
apparent disequilibrium and the enormous negative externalities it 
manifests, there appears to be some support for the proposition that 
regulatory competition may contribute to the production of socially sub-
optimal regulation. 
Finally, it is worth observing that the theoretical benefits of regulatory 
competition have not been empirically established and, generally speaking, 
do not appear to have translated well into the practical realm.
67
  
 
 63. This also would apply for quasi-federal systems such as the European Union. 
 64. Various ―passport‖ systems currently in operation in jurisdictions such as Canada 
and the European Union being the most notable exception to this general rule.  Broadly 
speaking, these systems contemplate that market participants can engage in activities within 
―host‖ jurisdictions provided that they are in compliance with the securities laws in their 
―home‖ jurisdiction. 
 65. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 58, at 1393.  
Regulatory competition theory implicitly relies on arbitrage as a mechanism for transmitting 
market information to regulators respecting the relative competitiveness of their regimes. 
 66. Although not exclusively, as it must be conceded that enhanced innovation, choice, 
and efficiency are likely to manifest potential positive externalities as well. 
 67. See Coffee, supra note 58, at 450, 457 (explaining that there are significant costs 
associated with regulatory competition, which, although not inherent in the ―pure theory of 
regulatory competition,‖ ultimately present themselves in ―institutionally complex 
environments‖); Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 58, at 1396-97 
(noting that proponents of issuer choice have failed to show how regulatory competition 
enhances social welfare); Karmel, supra note 60, at 544-45 (listing several practical 
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Accordingly, assertions that systems characterized by regulatory 
competition possess competitive advantages in terms of their ability to 
address behavioral biases and regulatory capture may not ultimately be as 
persuasive as they initially appear.  Furthermore, as explored in greater 
detail below, and in Part IV, problems of behavioral bias and capture can 
both be addressed, at least to a certain extent, via the judicious design and 
implementation of accountability, independence, and transparency 
mechanisms. 
Beyond the positive case for regulatory competition, critics emphasize 
a number of potential deficiencies with the theoretical arguments in support 
of integrated regulation.  First, critics observe that the theoretical 
economies of scale and scope derived from the integration of management 
functions will often prove exceedingly difficult to harness in practice.  
Extracting these economies will be at least partially contingent upon the 
extent to which integrated regulators are, for example, able to foster (1) 
healthy and functioning management structures and decision-making 
processes and (2) shared organizational cultures.
68
  Yet, fostering these 
organizational qualities may prove to be amongst the most difficult 
challenges facing integrated regulators,
69
 especially where integration is 
effected by way of the merger of multiple specialist agencies.  Second, the 
scale of integrated regulators may result in excessive bureaucracy and other 
diseconomies of scale,
70
 representing yet another challenge to their 
effective management. 
Even where integrated regulators successfully address these 
challenges, critics argue that the theoretical case for integrated regulation 
overstates the magnitude of the potential economies of scale and scope.  
Along this vein, several commentators have cautioned against overstating 
the trend toward integration within global financial markets.
71
  Indeed, 
while there certainly exists a (shrinking) cadre of true financial 
conglomerates, the business models of the vast majority of financial 
institutions are still built around core specialties in, for example, banking, 
 
problems observed among competing securities regulators but overlooked by economic 
theory). 
 68. Ferran, supra note 39 at 291-92; Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 17. 
 69. Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, at 18. 
 70. Cihak & Podpiera, supra note 16, at 11.  But see Abrams & Taylor, supra note 24, 
at 17 (suggesting that diseconomies of scale more likely reflect the quality of management, 
rather than the size of the organization). 
 71. Interestingly, while integration of this sort might have once been considered 
horizontal consolidation, the blurring of traditional distinctions raises the question of 
whether, for example, the merger of a commercial bank (originating loans) and an 
investment bank (repackaging and distributing these loans via securitization) might not 
actually be considered a form of vertical consolidation. 
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securities, or insurance.
72
  Simultaneously, however, recent history suggests 
that it is precisely these financial conglomerates, along with more 
integrated markets, such as those for OTC derivatives, which pose the 
greatest systemic risks. Accordingly, they warrant the lion‘s share of 
regulatory scrutiny.  Nevertheless, insofar as the integration of firms and/or 
markets represents the exception rather than the rule, either now or in the 
future, there exists a legitimate question as to whether the adoption of more 
comprehensive or holistic approaches toward regulation, as facilitated by 
the lower information and coordination costs associated with integrated 
regulation, will yield real world benefits in terms of regulatory outcomes.  
Furthermore, as Eilis Ferran has observed, any potential economies 
realizable by regulated firms under an integrated legal and regulatory 
framework (stemming from, for example, a reduction in compliance costs) 
are likely to hinge not on institutional design (i.e. the number and 
complexity of rulebooks), but rather on the substantive requirements 
thereby imposed upon firms.
73
  This observation finds tentative support in 
preliminary findings that suggest that the economies of scale and scope 
generated by integrated regulators may in fact be relatively small when 
compared with the overall costs of regulation.
74
 
Critics also question whether the adoption of a comprehensive or 
holistic approach toward financial regulation necessarily requires an 
integrated institutional architecture.
75
  Integration is by no means the only 
mechanism available for enhancing market surveillance, risk assessment, or 
coordination.  Committees of regulators, memoranda of understanding, and 
institutional models premised on a ―lead regulator‖ may also prove 
effective in these regards.
76
  Nevertheless, to the extent that it reduces the 
transaction costs associated with these activities relative to such 
mechanisms (and competing institutional models), integrated regulation 
arguably enjoys a comparative, albeit contingent, advantage. 
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, critics of integrated regulation 
observe that the integration of management functions raises the prospect of 
significant unintended—and decidedly negative—consequences stemming 
from (1) diminished accountability and (2) the sub-optimal balancing of 
competing regulatory objectives.  In terms of diminished accountability, 
 
 72. Ferran, supra note 39, at 277; see also Wilmarth, supra note 35, at 254-57 
(suggesting that smaller banks will continue to focus on providing personalized financial 
services, while larger banks will focus on providing sophisticated capital market services). 
 73. Ferran, supra note 39, at 284. 
 74. GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 25, at 154; Ferran, supra note 39, at 284; Kenneth 
Mwenda & Alex Fleming, International Developments in the Organizational Structure of 
Financial Services Supervision (Sept. 20, 2001) (World Bank Financial Sector Vice-
Presidency Seminar, Working Paper, 2001). 
 75. Coffee, Competition Versus Consolidation, supra note 58, at 450. 
 76. Briault, supra note 34, at 15; Martinez & Rose, supra note 23, at 8-9. 
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critics assert that the same concentration of power which imbues an 
integrated regulator with such a high degree of de facto accountability 
gives rise to a concomitant risk that it will become, in the words of one 
observer, ―an overmighty bully, a bureaucratic leviathan divorced from the 
industry it regulates.‖
77
  This concentration of power gives rise to a related 
concern that integrated regulators are more prone to regulatory capture.  
Indeed, both logic and experience suggest that these risks are very real.  In 
order to mitigate them, therefore, the de facto accountability associated 
with integrated regulation should ideally be accompanied by mechanisms 
that ensure sufficient de jure accountability.  These mechanisms might 
include (1) clearly articulated regulatory objectives, (2) mechanisms which 
ensure that these objectives are pursued in a transparent manner, (3) 
benchmarks against which the performance of the regulator can be 
objectively evaluated, (4) formal reporting and performance review 
processes overseen by the legislature, and (5) an independent body with the 
jurisdiction to review regulatory action. 
The integration of management functions is also the source of 
concerns respecting the sub-optimal balancing of competing regulatory 
objectives.  It is unavoidable that integrated regulators will be charged with 
responsibility for pursuing a broad range of regulatory objectives.  It is 
equally unavoidable that these objectives will frequently come into conflict 
with one another.  An oft-cited example of this species of conflict is that 
which materializes in the context of a potential bank failure.  While 
disclosure of the potential failure would further the objectives of market 
transparency and potentially consumer protection, disclosure might also 
undermine financial stability.  An even more omnipresent conflict, and one 
which will be explored in greater detail in Part IV, is that between 
maintaining market confidence, protecting consumers, and deterring 
financial crime, on the one hand, and promoting globally competitive 
domestic financial markets, on the other.  Indeed, wherever an integrated 
regulator is faced with the complex task of balancing competing regulatory 
objectives, there exists the risk that a sub-optimal balance will be struck, or 
that one or more of these objectives will be outright subordinated.
78
  
Ultimately, however, it is contestable whether striking the optimal balance 
between competing regulatory objectives is a challenge at all unique to 
integrated regulation or whether, perhaps more realistically, it is one that 
 
 77. TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 15.  See also GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 25, at 153-54 
(noting that a regulator may become so large and powerful that its power may become 
excessive). 
 78. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm‘r, U.S. SEC, Putting Investors First in Regulatory 
Reform, Remarks at Compliance Week Annual Conference (June 3, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/28/making-investors-a-priority-
in-regulatory-reform/) (explaining that the conflict of duties, which arise from having a 
single consolidated regulator, may ultimately lead to certain duties being subordinated). 
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haunts regulators of all institutional stripes. 
Having canvassed the sources of theoretical support for and against 
integrated regulation, along with the positive case for models based on 
multiple regulators, the time has come to test these theoretical hypotheses.  
The Petri dishes for these tests will be the pre-crisis regulatory regimes 
governing OTC derivatives markets in the U.S. and U.K. 
III.  TESTING THE THEORY:  COMPARING THE U.S. AND U.K. 
EXPERIENCES REGULATING OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
A.  The Regulation of OTC Derivatives Markets:  A Case Study 
The regulation of OTC derivatives markets represents a compelling 
case study against which to test the theoretical hypotheses explored above 
for two principal reasons.  First, and most immediately, the (mis)use of 
certain types of OTC derivatives played a prominent role in the thick of the 
global financial crisis.  Complex collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
underpinned the ―originate and distribute‖
79
 lending model that precipitated 
the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis and facilitated its spread throughout the 
financial system.  The resulting correction unleashed a wave of uncertainty 
(and, consequently, illiquidity) within CDO and related markets.  This 
liquidity crunch generated negative balance sheet implications for financial 
institutions and, ultimately, precipitated the flight of assets and collateral 
calls which triggered the near collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and, 
in September, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  September 2008, would 
also see AIG—putatively the world‘s largest insurance company—brought 
to its knees as a result of massive speculative trading in credit default 
swaps (CDS) on CDOs.
80
  Each of these global financial titans was subject 
to regulatory oversight in both the U.S. and U.K. 
It is AIG, however, that arguably represents the most intriguing case.  
Regulated primarily as an insurance company on both sides of the Atlantic, 
the downfall of AIG was ultimately attributable to OTC derivatives trading 
at its London-based (but French regulated) subsidiary, AIG Financial 
Products Corp (AIGFP).  Given the scale of AIGFP‘s derivatives-related 
operations, and its significance to AIG‘s bottom line, both of which were 
apparent on the face of AIG‘s public filings,
81
 it is curious that the 
 
 79. Rather than continuing to hold debt unhedged on their balance sheets the ―originate 
and distribute‖ model contemplates that lenders will repackage the debt and distribute it to 
third party investors via securitization.  Amongst other implications, this has the effect of 
reducing or even eliminating the lenders‘ exposure to borrower default and, thus, reduces 
the incentives of lenders to invest resources in establishing and monitoring creditor quality. 
 80. See William Sjostrom, Jr, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009) 
(providing a detailed account of AIG‘s derivatives operations, how they precipitated the 
firm‘s downfall, and the subsequent bailouts). 
 81. For example, AIG‘s 2007 Annual Report disclosed a USD$9.5 billion operating 
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operations of AIGFP did not attract greater regulatory scrutiny from either 
the FSA or the Office of Thrift Supervision, its primary U.S. regulator.  As 
will be explored in greater detail in Part IV, examining the likely 
explanations for this apparent oversight yields potentially valuable insights 
regarding the optimal structure of financial regulation. 
Secondly, and as amply illustrated by the global financial crisis, OTC 
derivatives markets pose numerous challenges for financial regulators.  
These challenges stem from, inter alia, (1) their size and systemic 
importance; (2) the complex linkages they generate between derivative, 
underlying, and related markets; (3) the opportunities they generate for 
opportunistic behavior, market manipulation, and welfare reducing 
regulatory arbitrage; and (4) the extent to which they defy ―traditional‖ 
categorization as banking, securities, or insurance markets.  These 
challenges span the entire spectrum of objectives pursued by financial 
regulators, from enhancing market efficiency and protecting consumers to 
ameliorating systemic risks.  Indeed, OTC derivatives have become the 
very embodiments of the increasing integration and complexity of global 
financial markets.  Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the nature of these 
challenges play strongly to the theoretical strengths of integrated 
regulation.  Nevertheless, as will be explored in greater detail below, 
integrated regulation, in practice, has arguably proven no more effective in 
responding to the challenges of regulating OTC derivatives markets than 
other institutional models.  Perhaps nowhere is this divergence of theory 
and practice more clearly evidenced than in the regulatory experiences of 
the U.S. and the U.K. 
B. The U.S. Experience 
The origins of OTC derivatives regulation in the U.S. can be traced 
back to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,
82
 Exchange Act of 
1934,
83
 and Commodity Exchange Act.
84, 85
  Although modern OTC 
 
loss attributable to the operations of AIGFP.  Id. 
 82. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933)). 
 83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a 
(1934)). 
 84. Commodity Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 
(1936)). 
 85. The Future Trading Act (FTA) of 1921, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) 
(enacting the first derivatives-related regulation to be enacted in the United States, imposing 
a prohibitive tax on grain futures not traded on an authorized board of trade, and giving the 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture the authority to designate authorized boards of trade upon 
evidence that they would comply with statutory conditions respecting, inter alia, transaction 
recordkeeping, market manipulation and admission of members). The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, found the enactment of the FTA to be an unconstitutional use of the taxing power 
to regulate exchanges; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). The FTA was subsequently 
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derivatives markets would not emerge for another four decades, the path 
dependency and resulting institutional schism created by these New Deal 
reforms would have a profound impact on subsequent developments. 
Enacted in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929, the dual objectives of 
the Securities Act are to (1) require that investors receive material 
information concerning securities being offered for sale to the public; and 
(2) prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of 
securities to the public.
86
  The Securities Act governs the sale of securities 
in the primary market, mandating, subject to certain exemptions, the 
disclosure of material information through the registration of securities 
with the SEC and the issuance to investors of a prospectus in connection 
with any distribution of securities.  The SEC itself was established under 
the Exchange Act, which, inter alia, governs the trading of securities in the 
secondary market.  Importantly, the requirements of both the Securities Act 
and Exchange Act are triggered, with certain prescribed exemptions, only 
with respect to instruments that fall under the definition of a ―security.‖
87
 
Enacted in 1936, the Commodity Exchange Act conferred upon the 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture the authority to designate authorized boards 
of trade (or ―contract markets‖) and to license brokers trading futures 
contracts
88
 in commodities such as grain, butter, cotton, rice, mill feeds, 
potatoes, and eggs.
89
  Upon designation, the Commodity Exchange Act 
 
reenacted under Congress‘s inter-state commerce power as the Grain Futures Act, 42 Stat. 
998, codified as 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1922), the constitutionality of which was ultimately upheld by 
the Supreme Court in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). 
 86. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a 
et seq), http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
 87. Securities Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq, ss. 2(a)1, 3 (defining a security as ―any 
note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided 
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any 
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities [including any interest therein 
or based on the value thereof], or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on 
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a ‗security,‘ or any certificate of interest or participation in, 
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing‖).  None of these categories of security has historically 
been interpreted as encompassing OTC derivatives. 
 88. A futures contract is a type of derivative contemplating the purchase or sale of a 
commodity in the future at a pre-determined price. 
 89. The Commodity Exchange Act thus expanded upon (and superceded) the Grain 
Futures Act.  See generally Daniel Fischel, Regulatory Conflict and Entry Regulation of 
New Futures Contracts, 59 J. BUS. L. S85 (1986) and Roberta Romano, The Political 
Dynamics of Derivatives Security Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997) (discussing 
how the Commodity Exchange Act did little to alter the process for contract market 
designation established under the Grain Futures Act). 
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imposed upon contract markets requirements respecting, amongst other 
matters, transaction recordkeeping and the admission of members.
90
  The 
Commodity Exchange Act also introduced new penalties for fraud and 
market manipulation, set speculative position limits, and imposed conduct 
of business requirements.
91
  Administration of the Commodity Exchange 
Act fell to a new agency, the Commodity Exchange Commission, which 
was created as a division of the Department of Agriculture.  Importantly, 
while the regulatory regime created under the Commodity Exchange Act 
was expressly designed to govern all contracts for the sale and future 
delivery of specified commodities, Congress made no attempt to define a 
―futures contract.‖ 
Following the watershed reforms of the 1930s, the structure and 
substantive regulation of U.S. derivatives markets remained largely 
unchanged until the early 1970s.  Then, in 1972, in the wake of the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME), a designated contract market under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, began trading futures contracts on foreign currencies.
92
  
That same year, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), an offshoot 
of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), was created and registered with 
the SEC to trade in futures on individual securities.
93
  Motivated in large 
part by these developments,
94
 Congress enacted the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission Act of 1974 (CFTCA).
95
  The primary thrust of the 
CFTCA was to create the CFTC as an independent agency (analogous to 
the SEC) for the purpose of regulating futures and commodity options 
markets.  The CFTCA conferred upon the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction to 
regulate all transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for 
future delivery and all options thereon, subject to a savings clause designed 
to preserve the jurisdiction of the SEC.
96
  In addition, the CFTCA expanded 
 
 90. Fischel, supra note 89, at S87; Romano, supra note 89, at 17. 
 91. Romano, supra note 89 (governing, for example, the segregation of customer 
accounts). 
 92. Todd Petzel, Derivatives: Market and Regulatory Dynamics, 21 J. CORP. L. 95, 97 
(1995). 
 93. Id. at 98. 
 94. Romano, supra note 89, at 24-25 (enumerating the motivations behind the 
enactment of the CFTCA.  First, the moves by the CME, CBOE, and CBOT into new non-
agricultural derivatives such as precious metals and currencies exposed both (1) the need to 
extend the scope of regulation to cover previously unregulated derivatives and (2) that these 
non-agricultural derivatives were beyond the traditional competence of the Department of 
Agriculture.  Compounding matters, rapid food price inflation had resulted in a perception 
[fueled by vested interests] that better commodity markets regulation was required). 
 95. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). 
 96. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, s.2(a)1(A) (establishing that notwithstanding the introduction of 
this exclusivity clause, the CFTCA did not provide any further clarity regarding the 
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the scope of the Commodity Exchange Act to include previously 
unregulated commodities and ―all other goods and articles, and all services, 
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or 
in future dealt with.‖
97
  The CFTCA also required designated contract 
markets to demonstrate that trading in a proposed contract would not be 
contrary to the public interest.
98
 
Frictions between the CFTC and other federal regulators first emerged 
during the legislative wrangling that preceded the enactment of the 
CFTCA.  The SEC lobbied vigorously for a carve-out from what it 
perceived as the CFTC‘s overly broad exclusive jurisdiction clause.  On its 
face, the clause granted the CFTC jurisdiction over trading in futures and 
options contracts, not just on designated boards of trade, but also on ―any 
other board of trade, exchange or market.‖
99
  The U.S. Treasury 
Department also lobbied to curtail the scope of the clause
100
 and ultimately 
obtained the so-called ―Treasury Amendment,‖ which stipulated that the 
CFTC‘s jurisdiction would not extend to transactions in foreign currencies, 
security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, 
repurchase options, government securities, mortgages or mortgage 
purchase commitments (unless such transactions involved the sale thereof 
for future delivery conducted on a designated contract market).
101
  
Importantly, trading in these instruments was, at the time, almost 
exclusively the purview of large commercial and investment banks.  The 
Treasury Amendment thus effectively carved out much of the fledgling 
OTC (inter-bank) market, as it then existed, from CFTC jurisdiction—
much to the benefit of the U.S. banking industry.  It would be the first, but 
by no means only, occasion on which federal banking regulators
102
 would 
intervene to oppose regulatory intervention into OTC derivatives markets. 
The building jurisdictional tensions between the SEC and CFTC only 
intensified after the enactment of the CFTCA.  In September 1975, the 
CFTC granted a CBOT application for designation as a contract market in 
respect of futures on Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) 
 
definition of a ―contract for sale of a commodity for future delivery‖ [i.e. a futures contract] 
for the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act). 
 97. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, s. 1(a)(4). 
 98. CFTC Guideline 1, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,217 (June 1, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
300). 
 99. Romano, supra note 89, at 34. 
 100. Letter from Donald Ritger, Acting General Counsel of the Treasury Department to 
Sen. Herman Talmadge, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry 
(July 30, 1974) (reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5887, 5887-5889). 
 101. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, ss. 2(c)(1) and (2). 
 102. Principally the U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, and Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency. 
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mortgage-backed pass-through certificates.
103
  This action provoked a letter 
from SEC Chairman Roderick Hills to the CFTC in which he asserted both 
that GNMA certificates and contracts for their future delivery constituted 
―securities‖ under the Securities Act and Exchange Act and that the 
CFTCA did not deprive the SEC of its jurisdiction over such instruments.
104
  
In response to the letter, the CFTC issued a memorandum that detailed the 
statutory foundation of the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction and refuted 
Chairman Hills‘s assertions.
105
  The CFTC would subsequently approve 
applications from the CBOT as well as other commodity exchanges for 
futures contracts on 90-day U.S. Treasury bills and, later, longer-term U.S. 
Treasury bonds.
106
 
Jurisdictional tensions would come to a head once again in the context 
of the CFTC‘s 1978 reauthorization hearings.
107
  The SEC, along with the 
CBOE, General Accountability Office (GAO), and Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) challenged the CFTC‘s jurisdiction over futures 
contracts and options on securities.
108
  The SEC argued, inter alia, that (1) 
futures contracts and options on securities were functionally equivalent; (2) 
futures on securities affected the market in the underlying securities; and 
(3) the CFTCA had generated confusion around the extent to which persons 
purchasing securities could rely upon the protections of federal securities 
laws.
109
  For these reasons, the SEC argued that it was ―appropriate and 
necessary that the SEC‘s jurisdiction extend to futures contracts and 
options with respect to securities.‖
110
  Once again, however, the SEC‘s 
arguments failed to convince Congress:  the Futures Trading Act of 1978
111
 
essentially reaffirmed the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction over trading in 
 
 103. See CFTC.gov, History of the CFTC in the 1970‘s,  
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_1970s.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2010). 
 104. David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal 
Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599, 1637 (1986) (citing SEC-CFTC 
Jurisdictional Correspondence, compiled at [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,117). 
 105. Id. 
 106. CFTC Release No. 323-77 (Aug. 2, 1977); CFTC Release No. 92-75 (Nov. 26, 
1975). 
 107. The CFTCA established the CFTC as a so-called ―sunset agency,‖ requiring 
periodic reauthorization by Congress. 
 108. PHILIP JOHNSON & THOMAS HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 26 (Little, Brown, 
2nd ed. 1989); Fischel, supra note 88, at S88; Gilberg, supra note 104, at 1638; Romano, 
supra note 89, at 34. 
 109. Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285 Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Conservation and Credit, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 181-219 (1978) (testimony of 
SEC Chairman Harold Williams). 
 110. Id. at 216. 
 111. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865. 
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futures markets—including futures contracts and options on securities.
112
 
The 1980s represented a period of revolutionary change and dramatic 
growth within OTC derivatives markets.  Perhaps most significantly, the 
1980s would witness the emergence, growth, and proliferation of swaps 
markets.
113
  It is widely believed that the first swap (a currency swap 
between IBM and the World Bank) was entered into in 1979.
114
  The 
emergence of markets for interest rate (c. 1981), commodity (c. 1986), and 
equity (c. 1989) swaps would follow over the course of the next decade.
115
  
These markets would go on to grow and mature for several years, 
seemingly under the jurisdictional purview of neither the CFTC nor the 
SEC.  At the same time, and irrespective of the fact that the vast majority of 
swap transactions involved federally regulated banks both as market 
makers and counterparties, the growth and proliferation of these markets 
were apparently not viewed by federal banking regulators as meriting 
regulatory intervention. 
The 1980s also represented a period of increasing strain in the 
relationship between the CFTC and other U.S. financial regulators.  In 
February 1981, the SEC granted a CBOE application to trade options on 
GNMA certificates, taking the position that the Commodity Exchange Act 
did not affect the SEC‘s exclusive jurisdiction over options on securities 
traded on national securities exchanges.
116
  The CBOT challenged the 
SEC‘s approval of the application on the basis that GNMA certificates 
were commodities under the Commodity Exchange Act and, accordingly, 
that options on GNMA certificates fell within the CFTC‘s exclusive 
jurisdiction.  In a split decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th 
Circuit ruled for the CBOT, finding that the SEC had violated the CFTC‘s 
exclusive jurisdiction by authorizing the CBOE to trade the options.
117
  
While the SEC appealed the decision, the appeal was subsequently vacated 
 
 112. Id. § 2(13) (amending Commodity Exchange Act to require communications with 
the SEC, Treasury, and Federal Reserve with respect to areas of overlapping concern and to 
consider their views when approving applications for trading in futures on government 
securities). 
 113. Fundamentally, a swap is simply a series of forward obligations to acquire or 
dispose of an asset in the future at a predetermined price. 
 114. Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies of 
Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 379, 383 (1999) (citing JACK MARSHALL & KEN KAPNER, UNDERSTANDING SWAPS 
6-7 (John Wiley & Sons 1993)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,577, 22 SEC 
Docket 186 (February 26, 1981). 
 117. Bd. of Trade v. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, 677 F.2d 1137, 1161 (1982) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the savings clause in the Commodity Exchange Act was designed to 
preserve the SEC‘s jurisdiction over all security options—including options on GNMA 
certificates). 
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as moot as a result of the Shad-Johnson Accord.
118
 
In February 1982, the SEC and CFTC reached an armistice in the form 
of the Shad-Johnson Accord.
119
  Named after their respective chairmen, the 
Shad-Johnson Accord was ostensibly designed to preserve, to the extent 
practicable, the traditional roles of the feuding federal agencies.
120
  The 
Accord bifurcated jurisdiction over the regulation of derivatives markets, 
stipulating that (1) the CFTC would possess jurisdiction over futures 
contracts and options thereon on designated contract markets, along with 
futures contracts on exempted securities (other than corporate and 
municipal securities) and broad-based indices of securities, and (2) the SEC 
would possess jurisdiction over options on individual equities, foreign 
currencies traded on national securities exchanges, and non-exempt (non-
U.S. government issued) bonds.
121
  The Accord also mandated consultation 
between the SEC and CFTC with respect to the approval of stock index 
futures and options on futures.
122
  The arrangements were subsequently 
codified in The Futures Trading Act of 1982 (FTA 1982)
123
 as part of the 
CFTC‘s second reauthorization.  Notably, and over the strenuous 
objections of the CFTC,
124
 the FTA 1982 went beyond the terms of the 
Accord to confer upon the SEC a veto power over CFTC approval of stock 
index futures and options on such futures which were not broadly-based or 
which were otherwise susceptible to manipulation. 
The enactment of the FTA 1982 was arguably followed by a period of 
relative inter-agency harmony.  In 1984, for example, the CFTC and SEC 
issued a joint policy statement setting out the species of financial 
derivatives that the two agencies believed were suitable for trading.
125
  This 
harmony would, however, prove short-lived.  The détente was initially 
threatened in 1987 when the CFTC launched an investigation into the 
commodity swap operations of Chase Manhattan Bank and announced a 
proposal to regulate hybrid and commodity swaps, suggesting that these 
 
 118. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n v. Bd. of Trade, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). 
 119. CFTC and SEC Jurisdictional Agreement: Proposed Legislation, [1980-1982 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982) [hereinafter Shad-
Johnson Accord] (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). 
 120. Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain 
Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 
1457 (1990) (citing S. REP. NO. 97-384, at 22 (1982)). 
 121. Shad-Johnson Accord, supra note 119. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) [hereinafter 
―FTA 1982‖]. 
 124. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2, at 40-41 (1982) (reprinting a letter from CFTC 
Chairman Philip Johnson to Congressman Edward Madison). 
 125. Designation Criteria for Futures Contracts and Options on Futures Contracts 
Involving Non-Diversified Stock Indexes of Domestic Issuers, Commodity Exchange Act 
Release No. 20,578, 49 Fed. Reg. 2884 (January 24, 1984). 
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instruments might constitute unauthorized (and therefore illegal) off-
exchange futures contracts.
126
  The threat of more burdensome exchange-
style regulation imposed by a regulator with little formal expertise in 
banking—and, perhaps more importantly, with whom (unlike federal 
banking regulators and Congress) it had not previously cultivated a 
relationship—was understandably a source of anxiety for the U.S. banking 
industry and, in the view of many observers, a catalyst for the subsequent 
migration of commodity swaps markets to overseas financial centers such 
as London.
127
 
The simmering turf war between the SEC and CFTC would come to a 
rolling boil in 1988-89.  In February 1988, SEC Chairman David Ruder 
testified before Congress that futures markets in stock indices had disrupted 
underlying markets in advance of the October 1987 stock market crash, and 
would continue to do so in the future unless brought within the jurisdiction 
of the SEC.
128
  That same year, the SEC approved an application for trading 
in index participation units (―IPs‖), a hybrid security exhibiting 
characteristics of both securities and futures.  The CME brought an action 
claiming that the SEC had impinged upon the CFTC‘s exclusive 
jurisdiction.  As it had done with GNMA certificates, the 7th Circuit held 
that IPs were futures contracts falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the CFTC and, accordingly, that they could only be traded on CFTC-
designated contract markets.
129
 
The decision marked a low point in the dispute between the SEC and 
CFTC for two reasons.  First, it appears that the CME brought its action not 
with the intention of itself offering a competing instrument, but rather 
simply to prevent the trading of IPs on SEC-regulated exchanges.
130
  
Viewed in this light, the decision thus served simply to thwart innovation 
and competition.  Second, the fight over IPs exposed the Shad-Johnson 
 
 126. E.g., Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (Dec. 11, 
1987) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34).  See Sheila Bair, Regulatory Issues Presented by the 
Growth of OTC Derivatives: Why Off-Exchange is No Longer Off-Limits, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS 700 (Robert Klein & Jess Lederman eds., 
Irwin Professional Publishing 1994); Romano, supra note 89, at 360. 
 127. Bair, supra note 126, at 700. 
 128. See “Black Monday,” The Stock Market Crash of October 19, 1987: Hearing on 
The Turbulence of Our Financial Markets During That Period, and Proposals For 
Structural and Regulatory Reforms Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 100th Cong. 141-58 (testimony of David Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange 
Commission) (concluding that changes must be made if the markets are to remain healthy). 
 129. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, 883 F.2d 537 (1989). 
 130. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1991-S. 207: Hearing on S. 207 Before the S. 
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 102nd Cong. 161-90 (1991) (pointing to 
how the CME wrote to the SEC arguing that IPs were still considered futures and thus 
illegal).  See also Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 120, at 1437-38 (noting the SEC 
chairman‘s statement that futures exchanges had no desire to trade IPs). 
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Accord as fundamentally inoperable, requiring coordination and consensus 
that could not be obtained within the context of rapidly evolving 
derivatives markets.
131
  Each of these observations are clearly salient to the 
present exploration.  The success of the CME in preventing the 
introduction of IPs illustrates how regulatory regimes characterized by 
multiple regulators can—rather than enhancing competition—be  
manipulated by market participants toward decidedly anti-competitive 
ends.  The failure of the SEC and CFTC to give effect to the Shad-Johnson 
Accord, meanwhile, demonstrates the practical shortcomings of informal 
arrangements and memoranda of understanding between multiple specialist 
regulators within the context of complex and dynamic global financial 
markets. 
Yet another significant point in the historical arc of U.S. derivatives 
regulation occurred later in 1989, when the CFTC issued a policy statement 
in which it purported to exempt swaps from its oversight.
132
  The policy 
statement, issued in response to industry concerns that swaps might be 
deemed futures (and thus illegal off-exchange contracts),
133
 acknowledged 
that swaps possessed certain features that distinguished them from futures 
contracts.
134
  The policy statement further explained that, while the CFTC 
also viewed swaps as possessing elements which mirrored futures and 
options contracts, the agency did not believe that it was the appropriate 
time to regulate these instruments.  Proceeding on this basis, the policy 
statement established a non-exclusive safe harbor for swaps transactions 
based on identified distinctions between swaps and futures.
135
  The policy 
statement did not, however, address whether swaps constituted futures 
contracts under the Commodity Exchange Act and, thus, left open the 
possibility that a court might subsequently hold that these instruments 
constituted futures contracts.
136
  Furthermore, swaps that did not satisfy the 
 
 131. Romano, supra note 89, at 358-59. 
 132. CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swaps Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 
30,694-95 (1989). 
 133. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES: THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REMAIN, 
GAO/GGD-97-50, at 2 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97050.pdf 
(noting that swaps and other OTC derivatives faced legal risk of being unenforceable 
because of CEA requirements). 
 134. CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swaps Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. at 30,696 
(1989). 
 135. The policy statement identified five criteria relevant to determining whether the safe 
harbor applied:  (1) the existence of individually tailored terms, (2) the absence of an 
exchange-style offset, (3) the absence of a clearing organization or margin system, (4) that 
the transaction was undertaken in conjunction with a line of business, and (5) that the 
transaction was not marketed to the public.  Id. at 30696-97. 
 136. Gibson, supra note 114, at 407-08.  Indeed, this possibility became a reality when, 
subsequent to the issuance of the policy statement, a federal district court found that certain 
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requirements of the safe harbor continued to trade over-the-counter 
following the issuance of the policy statement.  As a result, the statement 
was less than entirely successful in generating greater certainty around the 
regulatory treatment of swaps.
137
 
The year 1989 would also mark the beginning of a protracted series of 
Congressional debates in connection with the reauthorization of the 
CFTC.
138
  Swaps dealers lobbied vigorously during the reauthorization 
process for regulations reflecting the CFTC‘s policy statement in order to 
avoid potentially burdensome regulation and reduce regulatory 
uncertainty.
139
  SEC Chairman Richard Breeden and Treasury Secretary 
Nicholas Brady meanwhile sought greater legislative clarity respecting 
stock index futures, ultimately resulting in a standoff with CFTC 
Chairwoman Wendy Gramm.
140
  After nearly three years of debate, this 
process culminated in the enactment of the Futures Trading Practices Act 
of 1992 (FTPA 1992),
141
 reauthorizing the CFTC and conferring upon it the 
authority to exempt certain exchanged-traded and OTC instruments from 
its oversight.  Congress then instructed the CFTC to exercise its new 
exemptive authority with respect to, inter alia, swaps and other hybrid 
instruments.
142
  In exercising its exemptive authority, the CFTC (once 
again) did not define swaps as futures or otherwise attempt to assert its 
authority.  Indeed, the CFTC even acknowledged that, were a court to find 
that swaps fell within the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction, the exemption 
would still operate so as to render the instruments legal even if they failed 
to meet all the requirements of the exemption.  While this 
acknowledgement provided market participants with some additional 
comfort, there remained lingering uncertainty insofar as there was nothing 
preventing the CFTC from subsequently revoking the exemptions, thus 
pulling the rug out from under the maturing swap and hybrid markets. 
Any legal certainty provided by the FTPA 1992 was soon eliminated, 
 
OTC energy contracts constituted futures contracts.  Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North 
Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 137. See Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. 
PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 421, 438-42 (2001) (detailing how swap practices conflicted with 
several assumptions made by the CFTC‘s policy statement). 
 138. See Romano, supra note 89, at 353-368 (describing the legislative history of the 
CFTC‘s 1992 reauthorization). 
 139. Petzel, supra note 92, at 102. 
 140. Romano, supra note 89, at 362-65. 
 141. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (FTPA 1992), 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1994). 
 142. The CFTC granted the anticipated exemptions in 1993.  See CFTC Regulation of 
Hybrid Instruments, 17 C.F.R. § 34 (1994).  For swaps to be exempt they had to be between 
―appropriate persons‖ including commercial entities or wealthy, sophisticated 
counterparties.  Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 58 Fed. Reg. 5580, 5581 (Jan. 22, 1993); 
7 U.S.C. §§ 6(c)(2)(B)(i), 6(c)(3) (2000).  Notably, exempted instruments were not exempt 
from the manipulation and anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act.  Id. 
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however, when, in December 1994, the SEC and CFTC entered into 
simultaneous, yet separate, settlement agreements with BT Securities 
Corporation (BT).  The settlements stemmed from BT‘s misconduct in 
connection with two leveraged swap transactions entered into with its 
client, Gibson Greeting Cards.
143
  That same month, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York entered into an agreement with Bankers Trust New 
York Corporation, the parent company of BT, respecting the future conduct 
of leveraged derivatives transactions.
144
  The CFTC asserted jurisdiction, 
alleging that BT had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange Act and had been acting as an unauthorized commodity-trading 
advisor.
145
  Conspicuous in its absence from the CFTC‘s claim, however, 
was any assertion that the swaps constituted futures contracts.  The SEC 
also asserted jurisdiction on the basis that some of the impugned 
transactions included embedded options on securities.  The SEC alleged 
that BT had failed to disclose information and provided incorrect 
valuations to Gibson, causing it to make material misstatements in its 
financial statements filed with the SEC.
146
  Less than a year later, the CFTC 
entered into a settlement agreement with Metallgesellschaft (MG) 
following allegations that MG sold illegal off-exchange energy futures.
147
  
On one level, the BT and MG settlements can be viewed as laudable 
responses to questionable market conduct.  On another level, however, 
these settlements served to highlight the jurisdictional tensions and 
resulting lack of coordination between the SEC, CFTC, and federal 
banking regulators, adding to the mounting regulatory uncertainty 
surrounding OTC derivatives markets.
148
 
Hostilities between the SEC and CFTC would flare up once again in 
1997.  The first salvo was fired when, much to the consternation of the U.S. 
banking industry, the CFTC attempted to assert jurisdiction over the OTC 
market in foreign currency options.  The CFTC‘s incursion was ultimately 
 
 143. BT Sec. Corp., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8579 (Dec. 22, 1994); Enforcement 
Proceedings, 94-243 SEC NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 22, 1994; BT Sec. Corp., CFTC No. 95-3 
(Apr. 11, 1995), 1995 CFTC LEXIS 76; see also James Overdahl & Barry Schachter, 
Derivatives Regulation and Financial Management: Lessons from Gibson Greetings 24:1 J. 
FIN. MGMT. 68, 68-78 (1995) (providing a detailed description of the mechanics of the BT 
Securities transactions). 
 144. Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 4, 1994). 
 145. Overdahl & Shachter, supra note 143, at 73. 
 146. Id. 
 147. MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. et. al., CFTC No. 95-14 (July 27, 1995), 1995 CFTC LEXIS 
190. 
 148. See Overdahl & Schachter, supra note 143, at 75 (―[T]he SEC‘s assertion of 
jurisdiction (like the CFTC‘s assertion of jurisdiction) is just that—an assertion[—and] 
could be challenged in the future‖).  See also Petzel, supra note 92, at 103 (describing the 
regulatory ambiguity engendered by the SEC and the CFTC entering into settlements with 
BT). 
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rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that options on foreign 
currencies fell squarely within the scope of the Treasury Amendment.
149
  
Then, in December 1997, the SEC announced a proposal contemplating the 
limited regulation of broker-dealers trading in certain OTC derivatives 
markets.
150
  The proposal, referred to as ―Broker-Dealer Lite,‖ was 
designed to attract OTC derivatives business—much of which had by this 
point fled to other jurisdictions—back to the U.S.
151
  In a comment letter to 
the SEC, the CFTC objected to the proposal on the basis that it encroached 
upon the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction.
152
  The final salvo of 1997 was 
fired by the SEC in December when it vetoed a CBOT application to trade 
futures and options on futures in two Dow Jones indices on the basis that 
they were not sufficiently broad-based to meet the requirements under the 
FTA 1982.
153
 
Undaunted, the CFTC continued to press its case, issuing a Concept 
Release in May 1998 announcing its plan to re-examine its regulatory 
approach toward OTC derivatives markets and, specifically, swaps.
154
  The 
Concept Release was framed by the CFTC as part of a comprehensive 
reform effort designed to update its oversight of both exchange-traded and 
OTC derivatives markets
155
 and sought comment on a number of areas of 
potential reform.
156
  The issuance of the Concept Release was motivated, 
 
 149. Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465 (1997). 
 150. OTC Derivatives Dealers, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,940 (Dec. 30, 1997) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 249 and 249).  The proposal contemplated, inter alia, that broker-dealers 
selling certain OTC derivatives (including interest rate, currency, equity, and commodity 
swaps) would be permitted, under certain prescribed circumstances, to establish and register 
with the SEC designated subsidiaries for the purpose of engaging in such transactions.  
Designated subsidiaries registered with the SEC would, under the proposal, enjoy relaxed 
net capital and margin requirements. 
 151. Id. at 67,941. 
 152. Gibson, supra note 114, at 391 (citing Nikki Tait, US Futures Watchdog Says SEC 
Exceeding Authority, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at 25 (reporting that in a letter to the SEC 
the CFTC stated that the SEC proposal ―would attempt to regulate a large number of OTC 
derivatives transactions beyond its jurisdiction, many of which are subject to the exclusive 
statutory jurisdiction of the CFTC‖)).  Notwithstanding the CFTC‘s objections, Broker-
Dealer Lite took effect on January 4, 1999.  OTC Derivatives Dealers, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,362 
(Nov. 3, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. parts 200, 240 and 249). 
 153. The veto was ultimately overturned by the 7th Circuit Court; Board of Trade v. 
SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 154. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (May 12, 1998) (Concept 
Release); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Issues Concept Release Concerning Over-the-
Counter Derivatives Market (May 7, 1998), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm; 
―CFTC Seeks Public Comment as it Reexamines Oversight of OTC Market,‖ 30 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep (BNA) No. 19, at 721 (May 8, 1998). 
 155.  Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. at 26,114. 
 156. Id.  The CFTC Concept Release sought comment with respect to, inter alia, eligible 
transactions, eligible participants, clearing, transaction execution facilities, registration, 
capital, internal controls, sales practices, recordkeeping, and reporting. 
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according to the CFTC, by substantial changes within OTC derivatives 
markets within recent years, including high profile derivatives-related 
scandals such as the BT and MG affairs and the 1995 collapse of Barings 
plc as a result of unauthorized (and undetected) OTC derivatives 
transactions conducted by trader Nick Leeson.
157
  The timing of the 
Concept Release—a matter of months after the announcement of Broker-
Dealer Lite—suggests perhaps that the CFTC may have also been 
motivated by a desire not to cede jurisdiction to the SEC.  The issuance of 
the CFTC Concept Release was seen by many as contrary to the intent of 
Congress in enacting the FTPA 1992 which, while conferring upon the 
CFTC exemptive authority with a view to promoting financial innovation, 
competition, and legal certainty, did not expressly confer upon the agency 
jurisdiction over OTC derivatives markets.
158
  Predictably, the CFTC 
Concept Release provoked a chorus of objections from market participants, 
the SEC, and federal banking regulators.
159
  Succumbing to the pressure 
from both industry and regulators, Congress ultimately introduced 
legislation to temporarily bar the CFTC from taking further regulatory 
action.
160
  In the end, the CFTC Concept Release thus only served to further 
compound the jurisdictional tensions and regulatory uncertainty 
surrounding OTC derivatives markets.
161
 
Not content simply to bar the CFTC from regulating OTC derivatives 
markets, Congress next turned its attention to the SEC.  As part of the 
sweeping financial sector reforms introduced under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (1999) (GLBA),
162
 Congress granted the SEC jurisdiction over 
swaps and other hybrid products.
163
  Simultaneously, however, the GLBA 
expressly excluded both security-based
164
 and non-security-based swaps
165
 
from the definition of a ―security‖ under both the Securities Act and 
Exchange Act and prohibited the SEC from, inter alia, registering a 
security-based swap or promulgating, interpreting, or enforcing rules with 
 
 157. See supra sources accompanying note 152. 
 158. Gibson, supra note 114, at 392. 
 159. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering 
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 767-768 (1999). 
 160. Financial Markets Reassurance Act of 1998, H.R. 4507, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 
1998) (limiting the authority of the CFTC to alter the regulation of certain hybrid 
instruments and swap agreements under the Commodity Exchange Act). 
 161. See David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, Who‟s in Charge? Agency Infighting and 
Regulatory Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C14 (noting tension between 
regulators and legislators over derivatives market oversight). 
 162. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) [hereinafter 
―GLBA‖].  The GLBA is most frequently associated with the dismantling of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 163. GLBA § 205. 
 164. As defined in GLBA § 206(c). 
 165. As defined in GLBA § 206(b). 
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respect to any security-based swap.
166
 
The state of affairs established under the GLBA would prove short-
lived.  Spurred by a report issued by the President‘s Working Group 
(PWG) on Financial Markets in November 1999,
167
 Congress enacted the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).
168
  Concerned 
that ―a cloud of legal uncertainty‖
169
 was undermining the U.S.‘s leadership 
in financial services, the PWG Report recommended additional 
deregulation and exemptions for OTC derivatives markets with a view to, 
inter alia, (1) promoting innovation and reducing risk by enhancing legal 
certainty and (2) enhancing the competitive position of the U.S. within 
global OTC derivatives markets.
170
  The CFMA attempted to clarify—
although effectively re-drew—the jurisdictional boundaries between the 
SEC and CFTC.  Amongst other matters, the CFMA redefined hybrid 
agreements so as to re-confer upon the SEC jurisdiction over hybrids which 
involved a security (including security-based swaps), a jurisdiction which 
had been removed only the previous year under the GLBA.  In addition, the 
CFMA repealed those portions of the Shad-Johnson Accord governing the 
regulation of single-stock futures, placing such instruments under the joint 
jurisdiction of the CFTC and SEC.  The primary thrust of the CFMA, 
however, was to exempt OTC derivatives markets from the regulatory 
oversight of the SEC, the CFTC, and state regulators.  Thus, after 25 years 
of jurisdictional feuding, U.S. regulators found themselves largely 
prohibited from regulatory intervention into OTC derivatives markets. 
Not surprisingly, the enactment of the CFMA ushered in a period of 
relative inactivity in the U.S. with respect to the regulation of OTC 
derivatives markets.  This regulatory stasis stood in stark contrast, however, 
with the precipitous growth and proliferation of OTC derivatives 
markets.
171
  Between December 2000 and June 2007, the notional amount 
of all outstanding OTC derivatives grew from USD$95.2 trillion to 
USD$516 trillion—an increase of 542%.
172
  In retrospect, this period would 
 
 166. See Securities Act, supra note 82, § 2A(a), (b). 
 167. PRESIDENT‘S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (Nov. 1999), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/otcact.pdf [hereinafter PWG 
REPORT] (report transmitted to Congress). 
 168. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 
Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 169. PWG REPORT, supra note 167, at 1. 
 170. Id. at 1-2. 
 171. Erik Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities 
Regulation, 38:3 CONN. L. REV. 393 (describing a pattern of, inter alia, regulatory inaction 
during periods of market growth). 
 172. Serge Jeanneau, Derivatives markets, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, 28, 31 (June 2001) 
and Ryan Stever et al., Highlights of international banking and financial market activity, 
BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, 19, 24 (Dec. 2007). 
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prove the calm before the storm.  Clouds would begin to gather in the 
summer of 2007 as rising defaults on U.S. sub-prime residential mortgages 
sent ripples through asset-backed securitization markets.  The clouds 
opened up in March 2008 when investment bank Bear Stearns received a 
last minute bailout from the federal government (in the form of a forced 
sale to JPMorgan Chase) after two of its hedge funds accrued devastating 
losses on thinly-traded CDOs on sub-prime mortgages.
173
  The storm would 
reach hurricane strength in September 2008 when investment bank Lehman 
Bros. announced that it was filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
following dramatic losses in its securitization business.  Within a matter of 
days, the resulting liquidity crisis claimed AIG, which received the first of 
several federal bailouts on September 16, 2008. 
The events of March-September 2008 spurred U.S. financial 
regulators to once again turn their attention to the regulation of OTC 
derivatives markets.  In March 2008, in the immediate aftermath of the 
Bear Stearns bailout, the CFTC and SEC entered into a mutual cooperation 
agreement with a view to enhancing coordination and facilitating review of 
new derivatives products.
174
  In November 2008, the CFTC, SEC, and 
Federal Reserve Board entered into a memorandum of understanding to 
establish a framework for consultation and information sharing on 
regulatory issues related to centralized counterparties for CDS contracts.
175
  
In December 2008, the CFTC announced that the CME had certified a 
proposal to clear CDS through the CME‘s clearing facilities.
176
  Then, in 
August 2009, the Obama Administration unveiled the centerpiece of the 
U.S. federal government‘s new approach toward the regulation of OTC 
derivatives markets:  the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 
2009, ultimately enacted in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).
177
 
 
 173. The $2 Bailout, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, at 81; What Went Wrong?, ECONOMIST, 
Mar. 22, 2008, at 79. 
 174. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC, SEC Sign Agreement to Enhance Coordination, 
Facilitate Review of New Derivatives (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5468-08.html. 
 175. CFTC.gov, History of the CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_2000s.html (last visited Sept. 17, 
2010). 
 176. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Announces that CME Has Certified a Proposal to 
Clear Credit Default Swaps (Dec. 23, 2008), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5592-08.html. 
 177. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 704, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank Act).  See also Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of 
the Treasury, Administration‘s Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final 
Piece of Legislative Language Delivered to Capitol Hill (Aug. 11, 2009),  
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg261.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Release] 
(including the proposed text of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009). 
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The Administration has characterized the objectives of its new 
approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets as to (1) guard 
against excessive systemic risk; (2) promote transparency and efficiency; 
(3) prevent market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other market 
abuses; and (4) block inappropriate marketing to unsophisticated parties.
178
  
The Act confers upon the CFTC and SEC the authority to require ―swaps‖ 
and ―security-based swaps,‖
179
 respectively, to be (1) centrally cleared 
through a CFTC-regulated derivatives clearing organization or SEC-
regulated securities clearing agency and (2) traded on a regulated board of 
trade, exchange, or alternative swap execution facility.
180
  A (security-
based) swap will be exempt from the central clearing and exchange trading 
requirements if one of the counterparties is not a ―financial entity‖
181
 or is 
using the instrument to hedge or mitigate commercial risk.
182
  In order to 
incentivize greater utilization of centrally-cleared and exchange-traded 
instruments, it is likely that the new regime will ultimately impose higher 
capital and margin requirements in connection with un-cleared (security-
based) swaps.
183
  The Act further requires the registration of, inter alia, the 
centralized counterparties,
184
 swap repositories,
185
 and alternative swap 
 
 178. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 177. 
 179. Taken together, the definitions of ―swap‖ and ―security-based swaps‖ encompass 
the vast majority of OTC derivatives instruments.  Dodd-Frank Act §§ 721 & 761. 
 180. Id. §§ 723 & 763.  The process of determining whether a particular group, category, 
type, or class of (security-based) swap will be subject to the central clearing and exchange-
trading requirements can be initiated by either the relevant clearing organization/agency or 
the relevant regulator.  Clearing organizations/agencies are required to submit to the CFTC 
or SEC, as applicable, any group, category, type, or class of (security-based) swaps it 
intends to accept for clearing and provide notice of this submission to its members.  Id.  In 
reviewing a submission, the CFTC or SEC will determine whether the submission is 
consistent with the core principles of the relevant clearing organization/agency.  Id.  The 
relevant regulator is also required to take into account the following factors:  (1) the 
existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate 
pricing data; (2) the availability of a rule framework, capacity, operational expertise, 
resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms that are consistent 
with the material terms and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded; (3) the 
effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the market for such 
contract and the resources of the clearinghouse available to clear the contract; (4) the effect 
on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to clearing; and (5) the 
existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the relevant 
clearinghouse or one or more of its clearing members, with regard to the treatment of 
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property.  Id. 
 181. The definition includes (security-based) swap dealers, major (security-based) swap 
participants and other categories of financial institutions.  Id. § 723. 
 182. Id.  This exemption is subject to a notification requirement.  The non-financial or 
hedging counterparty retains the option to require that the instrument be centrally cleared. 
 183. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 177.  However, the Act only mandates that 
the CFTC, SEC, and federal banking regulators, as applicable, set minimum capital and 
margin requirements.  Dodd-Frank Act §§ 731 & 764. 
 184. Id. § 725. 
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execution facilities which have, over the course of time, emerged and 
matured into the private regulatory infrastructure supporting many OTC 
derivatives markets.
186
  These entities (other than centralized counterparties 
registered with the SEC) are then required to comply with a set of ―Core 
Principles‖ and other requirements articulated in the Act and to design, 
implement, monitor, and enforce technical regulation in furtherance of 
these principles.
187
  While the Act does not articulate a similar set of core 
principles for SEC-registered centralized counterparties, it does mandate 
that the agencies adopt similar rules governing these registrants.
188
 
The Dodd-Frank Act carves up jurisdiction over OTC derivatives 
markets by distinguishing between contracts for the sale of a commodity 
for future delivery and swaps (subject to CFTC jurisdiction), and security-
based swaps (subject to SEC jurisdiction).
189
  Simultaneously, however, the 
Act mandates consistency and comparability between SEC and CFTC rules 
and regulations governing functionally or economically similar products 
and entities.
190
  To this end, the SEC and CFTC have been handed joint 
responsibility for fleshing out many of the technical details of the Act.
191
  
The Obama Administration also requested that the two agencies produce a 
joint plan for harmonizing the regulation of OTC derivatives markets.
192
 
The success of the new U.S. regulatory regime governing OTC 
derivatives markets will hinge on a number of as yet unresolved issues.  
The approach ultimately adopted by the CFTC and SEC with respect to the 
determination of whether a particular group, category, type, or class of 
(security-based) swap be will subject to the clearing requirement, insofar as 
it will serve to demarcate the perimeter of the new regulatory regime, will 
clearly impact the extent to which the Act will be able to achieve its stated 
objectives.  It appears unlikely, for example, that the tailored CDS on 
CDOs at the epicenter of AIG‘s collapse would be deemed appropriate for 
central clearing.
193
  In the same vein, it is an open question as to whether 
 
 185. Id. § 728. 
 186. Id. §§ 733, 763; see also Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives 
Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide 11:2 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 155 (exploring 
the costs and benefits of public and private systems of ordering within the context of OTC 
derivatives regulation). 
 187. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 725, 728, 733 & 763. 
 188. Id. § 712. 
 189. Id. §§ 712, 722, 761-763. 
 190. Id. § 712. 
 191. Id.  These responsibilities include defining the terms ―swap,‖ ―security-based 
swap,‖ ―swap dealer,‖ ―security-based swap dealer,‖ ―major swap participant,‖ ―major 
security-based swap participant,‖ and ―eligible contract participant.‖  Id. § 712. 
 192. See SEC & CFTC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION 
OF REGULATION (2009) (describing existing conflicts in statutes and regulations). 
 193. Darrell Duffie, How Should We Regulate Derivatives Markets? 6 (2009), 
http://www.pewfr.org/admin/project_reports/files/Pew_Duffie_Derivatives_Paper_FINAL-
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the capital and margin haircuts for un-cleared derivatives will effectively 
counterbalance the private incentives of dealers to circumvent centralized 
clearing and exchange-trading requirements.  Furthermore, the success of 
the Act in terms of its systemic protection mandate will depend on whether 
centralized counterparties are themselves sufficiently well designed and 
capitalized to withstand systemic shocks and whether mechanisms are 
established ex ante to effectively manage their failure.  Finally, only time 
will tell whether exchanges and alternative trading platforms will be able to 
deliver the liquidity, price transparency and low transaction costs promised 
by proponents of the Act.  Each of these issues will, at least in part, 
ultimately be conditional upon the materialization of competitive markets 
for both trading platforms and centralized counterparties.  For these and 
many other reasons, it is still too early to predict whether the Act will prove 
an effective response to the regulatory challenges posed by OTC 
derivatives markets. 
The response of U.S. regulators to the emergence, growth, and 
proliferation of OTC derivatives markets yield a number of observations.  
First, the existence of multiple regulators within the field—each with 
uncertain and often overlapping jurisdictions—appears to have increased 
the overall costs of regulation.  From the perspective of regulators, these 
costs include those stemming from, inter alia, the increased coordination 
and other transaction costs associated with the resolution of relatively 
frequent jurisdictional disputes, along with the attendant opportunity costs 
associated with the diversion of regulatory resources away from the design, 
promulgation, monitoring, and enforcement of substantive regulation in 
response to the myriad of challenges posed by OTC derivatives markets.  
From the perspective of market participants, meanwhile, the relevant costs 
include those incurred in connection with the interpretation of and 
compliance with the dense ―thicket of complicated rules‖
194
 which have 
been generated for the purpose of exempting OTC derivatives markets 
from regulatory oversight.
195
  Collectively, these costs have undermined 
both the effectiveness of U.S. financial regulation and the competitiveness 
of U.S. financial markets. 
A second observation stems from the role played by the U.S. 
Congress, Treasury Department, and Federal Reserve Board in supporting 
the development of OTC derivatives markets.  Despite the extensive 
involvement of the U.S. banking industry in these markets,
196
 federal 
banking regulators adopted a decidedly non-interventionist stance during 
 
TF-Correction.pdf (briefing paper for Pew Financial Reform Project). 
 194. Bloomberg Report, supra note 62, at ii. 
 195. These costs also include switching costs for those market participants who do not 
wish to remain exposed to the resulting legal uncertainty. 
 196. Both in their capacity as dealers and as market counterparties. 
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the boom years leading up to the global financial crisis.  Indeed, as 
evidenced by their opposition to, for example, the CFTC‘s exclusive 
jurisdiction clause and 1998 Concept Release, the Treasury and Fed 
actively intervened on multiple occasions to block regulatory intervention.  
Congress supported these efforts in each instance by enacting legislation—
the Treasury Amendment, the GLBA and, finally, the CFMA—which 
constrained the ability of other regulators (the SEC and CFTC in particular) 
to legislate the field.  The principal recipient of this beneficence was of 
course the U.S. banking industry itself, which derived potential private 
benefits from, amongst other sources, (1) lower overall costs of regulation 
and (2) the absence of market transparency vis-à-vis clients and non-bank 
counterparties.  This observation lends support to the thesis, developed by 
Simon Johnson and others, that the U.S. banking industry has succeeded—
primarily by inculcating a pervasive belief in the benefits of free markets 
and their importance in securing America‘s global position—in capturing 
both federal banking regulators and Congress.
197
 
These observations have important implications for the present 
inquiry.  As previously acknowledged, they support the theoretical 
hypothesis that systems premised on multiple regulators will incur higher 
coordination and other transaction costs.  Simultaneously, and as 
proponents of integrated regulation might predict, the fragmentation of the 
U.S. regulatory regime (and resulting inter-agency conflict) has resulted in 
the perpetuation of a regulatory framework which has become increasingly 
unreflective of the structure of the markets which it regulates and 
chronically (perhaps terminally) slow in responding to new market 
developments.
198
  The U.S. experience supports the case for integrated 
regulation in at least two other important respects.  First, the failure of U.S. 
regulators to generate substantive regulation in response to risks associated 
with OTC derivatives markets resulted in a form of de facto convergence 
within the market for regulation, effectively foreclosing the prospect of 
welfare-enhancing regulatory competition.
199
  Second, the role played by 
 
 197. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 5-6 (Pantheon Books 2010) (describing Wall Street‘s 
powerful and enduring influence on political ideology); see also Robert Weber, New 
Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the 
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1552013. 
 198. Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 120, at 1451, 1460.  As Russo and Vinciguerra 
observe, attempts in the U.S. to regulate OTC derivatives markets have frequently followed 
a discernable pattern:  (1) innovation within derivatives markets, (2) falling outside the 
current regulatory framework, (3) spawning jurisdictional conflict between regulators, and 
(4) resulting in a regulatory compromise which does little to address risks associated with 
OTC derivatives markets or prevent future jurisdictional disputes.  Id. 
 199. The Dodd-Frank Act might change this.  Specifically, centralized counterparties, 
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Congress and federal banking regulators in blocking regulatory 
intervention provides a potential rebuttal (albeit an anecdotal and largely 
inferential one) to those who assert that systems based on multiple 
regulators will prove less prone to capture.  Finally, understanding the 
regulatory environment in the U.S. is a necessary pre-condition to 
understanding the competitive dynamic which developed between the U.S. 
and U.K. in the years leading up to the global financial crisis.  As will be 
explored in greater detail below, this dynamic was highly influential in 
shaping the FSA‘s approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives 
markets. 
C. The U.K. Experience 
The U.K. has a long tradition of self-regulation.  This tradition has 
been variously explained on the basis of the U.K.‘s regulatory culture, 
broader political and cultural factors, and more grounded policy 
considerations such as the expertise, responsiveness, and cost-effectiveness 
theoretically associated with regulation generated by private actors.
200
  
Perhaps nowhere has this tradition been more clearly observable—or had a 
more profound impact—than in connection with the regulation of U.K. 
financial markets.
201
  Indeed, before the dramatic structural changes 
ushered in by the so-called ―Big Bang‖
202
 and the enactment of the FSA 
1986,
203
 the U.K. relied almost exclusively on private actors, informal 
measures, customary understandings,
204
 and moral suasion on the part of 
the Bank of England
205
 as sources of financial regulation. 
 
exchanges, and alternative swap execution facilities might conceivably compete on the basis 
of technical regulation (including requirements for admission for trading). 
 200. Rob Baggott, Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation, 
67 PUB. ADMIN. 435, 442-443 (1989). 
 201. BRIAN CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 365-66 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1997); LAURENCE GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A 
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office 1982); Baggott, supra note 200, at 
438. 
 202. ―Big Bang‖ (never the ―Big Bang‖) refers to the October 27, 1986 restructuring of 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  Formerly a private and autonomous association, Big 
Bang brought the LSE within the scope of the FSA 1986, abolished minimum commissions, 
and eliminated the longstanding distinction between stockbrokers and stockjobbers.  Big 
Bang also saw the removal of restrictions respecting the organization and ownership of LSE 
member firms, thus facilitating for the first time the acquisition of significant interests in 
members by other financial intermediaries.  Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, 
United Kingdom and United States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern 
Financial Markets, 38 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 317, 330 (2003). 
 203. Financial Services Act (FSA), 1986, c. 60 (Eng.). 
 204. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 320. 
 205. Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The Regulatory Efficiency of a Single Regulator in Financial 
Services: Analysis of the UK and Japan, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 23, 35 (2006). 
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The FSA 1986 imposed for the first time a statutory framework on the 
U.K.‘s self-regulatory infrastructure.  At its core, the FSA 1986 
contemplated a two-tiered system of ―co-regulation.‖
206
  This framework 
proceeded from the delegation of specified powers by the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI)
207
 to private sector ―designated agencies‖ (the 
first tier).  The most important of the designated agencies under the FSA 
1986 was, for the present purposes, the Securities and Investments Board 
(SIB).
208
  The SIB was responsible for setting the overarching regulatory 
framework and agenda through the issuance of Statements of Principle and 
Core Rules of broad application across all financial markets.
209
  Under the 
authorization and oversight of the SIB, day-to-day responsibility for 
promulgating, monitoring, and enforcing the vast majority of regulation fell 
to a small group of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), recognized 
investment exchanges, and professional bodies (the second tier).  The 
SROs, which were funded and partially managed by their member firms, 
included the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), Investment 
Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO), Financial Intermediaries, 
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA), and Life 
Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO).
210
 
 
 206. See CHEFFINS, supra note 201, at 367 (employing the term as coined in JOHN AYRES 
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION 
DEBATE 102 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992)). 
 207. Oversight of the SIB under the FSA 1986 was transferred from DTI to H.M. 
Treasury in 1992.  See Transfer of Functions (Financial Services), 1992, S.I. 1992/1315 
(U.K.). 
 208. FSA 1986, c. 60, § 114 (Eng.); Fin. Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order, 1987, 
S.I. 1987/942 (Eng.); Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) (No. 2) Order, 1988, S.I. 
1988/738 (Eng.).  The SIB was a private company limited by guarantee incorporated 
pursuant to the Companies Act 1985.  Nevertheless, the SIB exhibited several characteristics 
of a quasi-governmental agency.  For example, the chairperson of the SIB was selected 
jointly by H.M. Treasury and the Bank of England.  FSA 1986, c. 60, § 114, sched. 7 (Eng.).  
In addition, the agency accounted for the exercise of its powers through regular review 
meetings with H.M. Treasury.  At the same time, however, the FSA 1986 explicitly affirmed 
that the SIB was not subject to the financial and organizational constraints which apply to 
government departments; FSA 1986, c. 60, § 116, sched. 9 (Eng.).  For a more detailed 
description of the SIB, see CHEFFINS, supra note 201, at 366-367 (explaining the SIB‘s role 
within the regulatory structure, its powers, and the limits on its discretion). 
 209. The Statements of Principle articulated standards for any type of investment 
business done by any person.  The Core Rules covered conduct of business, financial 
resources, treatment of client funds, and unsolicited calls.  SROs could diverge from the 
Core Rules in certain circumstances with SIB permission.  SRO rules would further explain, 
extend, or qualify the Core Rules as appropriate for the particular investments supervised by 
the relevant SRO.  Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Law of Derivatives: An 
International Comparison, at 68 (Jan. 1995) (Austl.). 
 210. The five original SROs under the oversight of the SIB would in 1994 be 
consolidated into three:  the SFA, IMRO, and Personal Investment Authority (PIA).  As 
discussed in greater detail below, much of the impetus for this change would be provided by 
dissatisfaction respecting overlaps and possible gaps in the areas of responsibility of the 
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Pursuant to the FSA 1986, persons or firms dealing in, arranging 
dealings in, and managing or advising on ―investments‖ in the U.K. were 
deemed to be engaged in the ―investment business.‖
211
  Unless exempted, 
they were required to be authorized and registered either through 
membership in one or more SROs, as applicable, or by the SIB directly.
212
  
The FSA 1986 cast a wide net around the definition of an ―investment,‖ 
identifying an exhaustive list of instruments which included shares, 
debentures, government securities, and, importantly for the present 
purposes, options, futures, contracts for differences, and rights and interests 
in investments.
213
  Persons or firms whose business activities were captured 
within this net were subject to regulation by the SIB and/or the relevant 
SROs governing, amongst other matters, conduct of business, capital 
adequacy, financial and transaction reporting, segregation of client 
accounts, and custody of client assets. 
The most important SRO in terms of the regulation of derivatives was 
the SFA.  The SFA was responsible for regulating registrant persons and 
firms (1) dealing in, arranging dealings in, and advising on all types of 
investments, including futures, options and contracts for differences, (2) 
managing assets, some or all of which were derivatives instruments,
214
 and 
(3) managing or operating authorized unit trusts or recognized collective 
investment schemes, which were dedicated to derivatives.
215
  Other SROs 
played ancillary roles in regulating derivatives.  The IMRO, for example, 
regulated derivatives transactions, which were ancillary or incidental to a 
registrant firm‘s investment management or advisory business.  FIMRA 
regulated options on securities and equity indices traded on or under the 
rules of a recognized or designated investment exchange and used only for 
hedging.  LAUTRO, meanwhile, regulated the marketing of authorized unit 
trust schemes which invested in futures and options.
216
 
In addition to complying with general SIB Core Conduct of Business 
(COB) Rules and SFA Rules,
217
 registrant firms were required to comply 
with a number of requirements specifically targeted at derivatives.  The 
primary thrust of these requirements was to ensure the suitability of 
derivatives instruments for investment by certain types of customers.  As a 
starting point, both the SIB Core COB Rules and SFA Rules distinguished 
 
original SROs.  Ferran, supra note 39, at 267. 
 211. FSA 1986, c. 60, sched. 1, pt. II, s. 12. 
 212. FSA 1986, c. 60, pt. I, ch. 2, §§ 3, 4; FSA 1986, c. 60, pt. I, ch. 3, §§ 7, 25. 
 213. FSA 1986, c. 60, sched. 1. 
 214. Unless the investments managed were primarily securities. 
 215. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 208, at 67. 
 216. Id. 
 217. In addition to the SFA rules, registrant firms need to comply with the relevant U.K. 
listing requirements with respect to exchange-traded or ―securitized‖ derivatives. 
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between ―customers‖ and ―non-customers.‖
218
  Customers were then further 
divided between ―private customers‖ (primarily individuals and small 
business investors) and ―non-private customers‖ (effectively reserved for 
sophisticated market counterparties).
219
  These classifications were highly 
significant in that they determined the nature and extent of a registrant 
firm‘s obligations toward a given customer (or non-customer).  The 
greatest obligations were owed to private customers, the least to non-
customers.
220
 
Derivatives-specific regulations governing the relationship between 
registrant firms and their private customers included a prohibition against 
effecting, arranging, or recommending OTC derivatives to a private 
customer unless the registrant firm reasonably believed that the purpose of 
the transaction was to hedge against currency risk.
221
  Registrant firms were 
also required to (1) provide private customers with a Derivative Risk 
Warning Notice before trading in derivatives,
222
 (2) warn private customers 
of the potential difficulties associated with establishing a proper market 
price for, and disposing of, ―non-readily realizable investments‖ such as 
OTC derivatives,
223
 (3) disclose any position knowingly held by the 
registrant firm, or any associate, in the same (or a related) investment,
224
 
and (4) where the investment services involved derivatives, put in place a 
two-way customer agreement.
225
  The SFA also provided guidance that a 
customer should not be treated as an ―expert‖ (i.e. a non-private customer) 
in options and futures unless the customer was experienced in derivatives 
of the relevant kind—not just in other investments or types of 
 
 218. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 75 (citing SFA 
Rule 9-1).  Ed. note:  many of the SFA, SIB, and IMRO rules are practically unavailable, 
except by reference to the report. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 74. 
 221. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 81 (citing SFA 
Rule 5-44; IMRO Ch II Rule 3.13; and SIB Core COB Rule 27). 
 222. SECURITY AND FUTURE AUTHORITY BOARD, GUIDANCE NOTE TO SFA RULE 5-30. 
(Feb. 19, 1996).  The Notice described various types of derivatives and sought to explain 
their risks.  The Notice contained mandatory information respecting commissions, 
suspensions of trading, clearinghouse protections, and insolvency.  Where relevant, the 
Notice also contained information respecting OTC transactions, foreign markets, contingent 
liability transactions, and collateral.  Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra 
note 209, at 84-85. 
 223. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 85 (citing SFA 
Rule 5-30(5)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 88 (citing SFA Rule 5-23).  A two-way customer agreement was required to 
include information, if applicable, regarding (1) whether derivatives transactions may be 
undertaken, and (2) the basis upon which the customer would incur any contingent liability. 
Id. 
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derivatives.
226
  Lastly, with regard to collective investment schemes, SFA 
Rules contemplated marketing and investment restrictions for options and 
futures funds, along with special registration requirements for individuals 
engaged in their marketing.
227
  These rules were collectively designed to 
protect less sophisticated customers from the perils of trading in derivatives 
instruments.  Simultaneously, however, these rules adopted a non-
interventionist (effectively, a caveat emptor) approach toward the 
regulation of derivatives transactions between market counterparties. 
The two-tiered framework established under the FSA 1986 
formalized—without significantly altering
228
—a historically fragmented 
self-regulatory regime which over time had resulted in the development of 
markedly different institutional arrangements and legal regimes governing 
banking, securities, and insurance markets.
229
  Registrant firms were often 
regulated by multiple SROs, precipitating a degree of confusion and legal 
uncertainty and generating significant inefficiencies.
230
  Indeed, almost 
from the outset, the framework was criticized as unwieldy and unduly 
bureaucratic.
231
  Compounding matters, the SIB was widely perceived as 
weak, its only leverage being its nuclear power to derecognize an SRO.
232
  
This perception was re-enforced by a series of high-profile financial 
scandals, culminating in the 1995 collapse of Barings plc.  The Barings 
collapse in particular exposed the importance of effective coordination 
between banking and securities regulators within a fragmented regulatory 
system.
233
  These scandals also served to raise questions regarding the 
effectiveness of the SROs‘ efforts to prevent misconduct amongst their 
members.
234
  Ultimately, these perceived weaknesses—along with pressure 
 
 226. Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 78 (citing SFA 
Guidance (February 1994)). 
 227. See Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991, (incorporating 
amendments to regulations in releases 159, 169, 178, 189, 191, and 198); Companies and 
Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 209, at 81-82 (citing Financial Services 
Regulations 5.07(2), 5.21, 5.23, 5.25(3), and 5.63(1)). 
 228. One notable exception being the exemption of derivatives contracts from the 
application of the Gaming Act 1845.  FSA 1986, c.60, pt. 1, ch. 8, § 86.  This exemption is 
now contained in § 412 of the FSMA. 
 229. Ferran, supra note 39, at 260. 
 230. Id. at 265.  See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, ch. 2, (discussing the likely 
ineffectiveness of such ―nuclear‖ powers when they represent the only weapon in a 
regulator‘s enforcement arsenal). 
 231. Ferran, supra note 39, at 260. 
 232. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 334. 
 233. See Ferran, supra note 39, at 263 (citing REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING 
SUPERVISION INQUIRY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS (HM Stationery 
Office 1995)). 
 234. Id. at 267; Jerry Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities 
and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 
BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 319, 376-77 (2003). 
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from both the City (which saw greater formalization as a necessary 
response to increasing international competition)
235
 and Parliament (which 
anticipated pressure from the E.U. as a result of its entry into the field of 
financial regulation) —swung the tide in favor of greater formalization and 
less fragmentation.  By the Spring of 1997, the table was thus set for a sea 
change in the regulation of U.K. financial markets. 
The optimal structure of financial regulation—and, in particular, the 
appropriate policy response to the rapid evolution of financial markets and 
increasing international competition within the financial services 
industry
236
—was very much a live issue in the 1997 U.K. general 
election.
237
  Within days of its electoral victory, the incoming Labour 
government announced its intention to move the U.K. toward a single, 
integrated financial regulator.
238
  As Ferran observes, the government 
justified the move toward integrated regulation on the grounds that (1) 
―[t]he existing system was failing to deliver [high] standards of investor 
protection and supervision . . .;‖ (2) ―[t]he two tier structure under the 
Financial Services Act 1986 was inefficient, confusing, and lacked 
accountability and a clear allocation of responsibilities;‖ and (3) there 
existed the need for a regulatory structure that would reflect the integrated 
nature of modern financial markets.
239
 
The U.K. government wasted little time in moving forward.  In 
October 1997, the SIB was re-branded the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA).  Over the course of the next several months, most of the existing 
designated agencies and SROs would be merged into the FSA ―on a largely 
informal and ad hoc basis.‖
240
  In July 1998, the government published the 
Financial Services and Markets Bill in draft form.
241
  After a ―tortuous‖
242
 
legislative process, the Financial Services and Markets Act
243
 received 
Royal Assent in June 2000.  The FSMA created the FSA as the single, 
integrated regulator for financial services in the U.K., thus formally 
 
 235. Baggott, supra note 200, at 448. 
 236. See Reforming the City, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 19 (supporting the concept of 
an integrated regulatory regime in London). 
 237. See Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 331 (discussing the central role of the 
debate over integrated regulation in the 1997 U.K. general election). 
 238. Ferran, supra note 39, at 260. 
 239. Id. at 271. 
 240. Id. at 273 (citing Howard Davies, Law and Regulation, 3 J. INT‘L FIN. MKTS. 169, 
169 (2001)). 
 241. Press Release, Financial Services Authority, Publication of the Draft Bill (July 30, 
1998). 
 242. Grant Ringshaw, Editorial, Crackdown in the City: Slapped Wrists or Heads on 
Spikes? Grant Ringshaw Reveals the Plans of the World‟s Most Powerful Financial 
Regulator, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 25, 2001, at 5. 
 243. Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA), 2000, c. 8 (Eng.).  The FSMA came 
into full force and effect in December 2001. 
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absorbing within it the jurisdiction and functions of the SIB, other 
designated agencies, and SROs.
244
  The FSMA identifies the objectives of 
the FSA as to maintain market confidence, promote public awareness, 
protect consumers, and reduce financial crime.
245
  The FSA is responsible 
for prudential conduct of business and market standards across, inter alia, 
the securities, insurance, and banking industries.  It is also the U.K. Listing 
Authority. 
The FSMA is frequently described as ―framework‖
246
 legislation in the 
sense that it is structured around (1) the articulation of high-level objectives 
and (2) the conferral upon the FSA of a wide latitude to design and 
implement a regulatory regime capable of achieving these objectives.  
Accordingly, much of the substantive regulation governing U.K. financial 
markets is located not within the FSMA itself, but within secondary 
legislation, instruments, and other guidance issued by H.M. Treasury and 
the FSA. 
Following the same broad approach as the FSA 1986, the FSMA 
mandates that any person engaged in a ―regulated activity‖ must, unless 
exempted, be authorized by the FSA.
247
  Regulated activities under the 
FSMA include (1) ―dealing in investments,‖ (2) ―arranging deals in 
investments,‖ (3) ―deposit taking, safekeeping and administration of 
assets,‖ (4) ―managing investments,‖ (5) ―investment advice,‖ (6) 
―establishing collective investment schemes,‖ and (7) ―using computer-
based systems for giving investment instructions.‖
248
  The term investment 
is defined broadly so as to include, inter alia, ―securities,‖ ―instruments 
creating or acknowledging indebtedness,‖ ―instruments giving entitlement 
to investments,‖ ―options,‖ ―futures,‖ ―contracts for differences,‖ and 
―rights in investments.‖
249
 
Also like the FSA 1986, the FSMA prescribes regulation of both 
general and more targeted application to OTC derivatives.
250
  Regulation of 
general application (but nevertheless applicable to OTC derivatives) 
includes, for example, the liability imposed upon market participants in 
 
 244. ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 637 (Sweet & Maxwell 
4th ed. 2006) (1996). 
 245. FSMA §2(2). 
 246. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 202, at 330; Howard Davies, Integrated Financial 
Regulation: Lessons from the UK‘s Financial Services Authority, Speech to the Centre for 
Financial Studies, Frankfurt 1 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2001/sp86.shtml. 
 247. FSMA, §19. 
 248. Id. §22; Id. §§ 2-9, sched. 2. 
 249. Id. §§10-24, sched. 2. 
 250. See HUDSON, supra note 244, at 637 (characterizing them as, respectively, 
―macroscopic‖ and ―microscopic‖ forms of regulation). 
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connection with making misleading statements,
251
 creating a false or 
misleading impression as to the market,
252
 insider trading,
253
 and market 
abuse.
254
  Similarly, securitized derivatives offered to the public and 
admitted to the Official List maintained by the FSA in its capacity as the 
U.K. Listing Authority are subject to the relevant prospectus and disclosure 
requirements, along with other continuing obligations under U.K. Listing 
Rules.
255
 
Registrant firms are also subject to the requirements set out in the FSA 
Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS).  COBS rules flow from the 
categorization of clients as retail clients, professional clients, or eligible 
counterparties in accordance with, effectively, their ostensible level of 
financial expertise and sophistication.
256
  COBS rules require registrant 
firms to provide clients with a risk warning statement describing both the 
general and specific risks associated with certain designated investments 
(such as OTC derivatives) including, inter alia, those relating to leverage, 
volatility, and contingent liabilities.
257
  In addition, COBS rules require that 
registrant firms put in place two-way customer agreements in connection 
with transactions in such designated investments.
258
  Like their counterparts 
under the FSA 1986, these requirements are motivated by the desire to 
protect less sophisticated clients.
259
  Importantly, however, transactions in 
OTC derivatives between eligible counterparties are expressly exempted 
from these requirements,
260
 thus maintaining the non-interventionist 
approach adopted under the FSA 1986. 
In contrast with the fractured U.S. regulatory regime, the scope of the 
FSMA
261
 has been framed broadly enough so as to clearly bring OTC 
derivatives markets within the perimeter of the FSA‘s jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, despite sweeping structural changes, the FSA‘s non-
interventionist approach has remained functionally equivalent to both the 
regime adopted by the SIB under the FSA 1986
262
 and—even more 
importantly for present purposes—that perpetuated by the alphabet soup of 
 
 251. FSMA, §397(1). 
 252. Id. §397(3). 
 253. Id. §402(1). 
 254. Id. §118(1). 
 255. See HUDSON, supra note 243, at 650-656 (detailing the prospectus and disclosure 
requirements). 
 256. See FSA, CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK (COBS), ch. 3 (2010), available at 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/COBS/3/1 (identifying client classification for 
purposes of the handbook) [hereinafter COBS]. 
 257. Id. at ch. 14, §14.3.2. 
 258. HUDSON, supra note 243, at 667. 
 259. See id. (noting that the requirement is part of a policy to protect customer rights). 
 260. COBS, supra note 256, at ch. 1, annex. 
 261. And, indeed, the FSA 1986. 
 262. HUDSON, supra note 243, at 663. 
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U.S. regulators.  The salient question thus becomes: Why, despite the 
numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, did the FSA 
generate and adhere to a non-interventionist—and arguably sub-optimal—
approach toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets? 
IV.  DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE FSA‘S NON-INTERVENTIONIST 
APPROACH TOWARD THE REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS 
There can be little doubt that the FSA has harnessed many of the 
theoretical strengths of integrated regulation.  Through the articulation of 
regulatory objectives and principles of good regulation, the FSMA provides 
the FSA with a single, clear and, arguably, coherent mandate.  
Simultaneously, the FSMA confers upon the FSA a great deal of flexibility 
in terms of how it goes about achieving its mandate.  The FSMA also 
establishes a number of mechanisms designed to ensure the de jure 
accountability of the FSA to both the U.K. Parliament
263
 and public.
264
  The 
FSA has pursued large infrastructure projects such as Integrated Regulatory 
Reporting (IRR)
265
 and the Advanced Risk Responsive Operating 
Framework (ARROW)
266
 with a view to reaping the potential economies of 
scale and scope associated with integrated regulation.  Integration has also 
contributed toward the FSA‘s consistently high ranking relative to its 
international peers—and especially the U.S. —in terms of the delivery of 
 
 263. These mechanisms include the requirement in the FSMA that the FSA exercise its 
powers in a way which is compatible with its regulatory objectives.  FSMA, §2(1)(a).  As 
Briault observes, this requirement provides the foundation for the political and legal 
accountability of the FSA.  See Briault, supra note 34, at 10 (discussing requirements for the 
FSA that increase accountability).  Other accountability mechanisms established by the 
FSMA include (1) a requirement that the FSA make annual reports to H.M. Treasury, which 
must be put before Parliament (FSMA, §1, sched. 1), (2) the allocation of power to H.M. 
Treasury to appoint the FSA chairperson and board (Id.), and (3) the allocation of power to 
H.M. Treasury to order independent reviews of FSA‘s financial affairs (Id. §12) and 
commission independent inquiries into financial failures (Id. §14). 
 264. These mechanisms include a requirement in the FSMA that the FSA engage in 
public consultation before exercising its rulemaking powers, including the publication of 
draft rules and cost-benefit analyses.  Id. §§ 65, 121, 155.  In addition, FSA decisions are 
subject to review by an independent financial services tribunal (Id. §55), while the effects of 
FSA regulation on competition are subject to review by the Director General of Fair Trading 
and the Competition Commission.  Id. § 160. 
 265. FSA, BETTER REGULATION ACTION PLAN, PROGRESS REPORT 13 (2006); see also 
FSA, INTEGRATED REGULATORY REPORTING (IRR): CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND CERTAIN 
INVESTMENT FIRMS (2006) (setting forth the purposes and impacts of the IRR). 
 266. In a nutshell, ARROW is the FSA‘s integrated model for assessing risk, supervising 
registrant firms and targeting thematic work relating to consumers, sectors and multiple 
firms.  See FSA, What we do: regulatory approach, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/Approach/index.shtml (last updated Sept. 28, 
2010). 
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cost-effective regulation.
267
  This relative cost-effectiveness was, in turn, 
one of the key drivers underlying the growth of the U.K. financial services 
industry in the years building up to the global financial crisis.  Finally, 
although not directly attributable to integration, the FSA arguably exhibits 
many of the other key determinants of regulatory efficiency and 
effectiveness:  financial independence, adequate financial resources, and a 
comprehensive arsenal of enforcement powers.  The FSA might at first 
blush thus appear to represent a model institutional framework—in 
particular relative to the fractured, and in many respects dysfunctional, U.S. 
regulatory regime. 
Upon closer inspection, however, it would be unwise to herald the 
FSA as an unmitigated success for proponents of integrated regulation.  
The FSA is frequently described by market participants as overly 
bureaucratic, intrusive, and insensitive.
268
  In addition, the internal 
organization of the FSA—especially within the Risk Business Unit
269
—still 
reflects in many respects historical divisions between the banking, 
insurance, and securities industries.
270
  Indeed, for much of its existence, 
the FSA‘s organizational structure revolved more fundamentally around 
such sectoral divisions.  Finally, there is reason to question the extent to 
which the FSA is, in practice, accountable to either the U.K. Parliament or 
public.  In terms of de jure accountability, the FSMA precludes H.M. 
Treasury from directly interfering with the affairs of the FSA outside the 
limited circumstance in which FSA regulation is found by the Competition 
Commission to have had a significant and unjustified adverse effect on 
competition.
271
  In terms of de facto accountability, meanwhile, the fact that 
the FSA is wholly funded by industry levies constrains the ability of 
Parliament to exert influence over its affairs via the power of the purse 
string.  Perhaps even more importantly, this funding model gives rise to the 
possibility that the FSA (as a supplier of regulation) may be influenced by 
an acute degree of de facto accountability to market participants (as 
important consumers of regulation), thus raising the specter of welfare-
 
 267. Indeed, the cost effectiveness of the FSA‘s integrated institutional framework was 
arguably apparent from the outset.  Specifically, despite the wider scope of its jurisdiction 
relative to its predecessor agencies, the FSA cost less in real terms between 1998 and 2002.  
Briault, supra note 45, at 16. 
 268. The Regulator Who Isn‟t There, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2002. 
 269. The FSA‘s other major regulatory business unit, the Supervisory Business Unit, is 
organized on what might be characterized as a functional basis between small firms, retail 
firms, major retail groups, and wholesale firms. 
 270. Indeed, the Risk Group is divided on both a sectoral basis (between banking, 
insurance, asset management, and capital markets) and objectives-based basis (between 
prudential and conduct of business regulation).  FSA Organizational Chart 2010, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/Who/pdf/orgchart.pdf. 
 271. FSMA, §308. 
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reducing public choice and regulatory capture problems.  Ultimately, 
however, these problems collectively provide a fundamentally 
incomplete—and thus unpersuasive—explanation for why, despite the 
numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, the FSA 
generated a non-interventionist regulatory regime with respect to OTC 
derivatives markets. 
A more robust potential explanation for the FSA‘s pre-crisis approach 
toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets is that it was a product of 
one, or more likely a combination, of (1) poor coordination, (2) the FSA‘s 
attempts to balance competing regulatory objectives, (3) incentive 
problems which arise for national regulators such as the FSA in context of 
regulating globally integrated financial markets, and/or (4) the inherent 
limitations of regulation within highly complex and dynamic global 
financial markets.  Each of these potential explanations manifest important 
lessons for policymakers contemplating structural reform of financial 
regulation.  Perhaps most significantly, none of these potential explanations 
arise from challenges that are at all unique to integrated regulation. 
A. Poor Coordination 
The FSA has at times struggled to capitalize upon the theoretical 
potential of integrated regulation to enhance intra-agency coordination.  An 
internal report of the FSA‘s handling of the Equitable Life Assurance 
Company affair, for example, identified poor communication between 
individual regulators within the FSA as a deficiency in its regulation 
between 1999-2000.
272
  The FSA was also criticized by market participants 
in 2001 for failing to coordinate the approaches of its various specialist 
teams in connection with the introduction of the Integrated Prudential 
Sourcebook.
273
  More recently, the internal audit report of the Northern 
Rock crisis identified, inter alia, poor internal communication and 
information flow within the FSA, along with inconsistent implementation 
of rules and procedures, as contributing toward a sub-optimal supervisory 
strategy which allowed warning signs of the pending crisis at the bank to 
 
 272. Ferran, supra note 39, at 295 (citing REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY ON THE REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 
SOCIETY FROM 1 JANUARY TO 8 DECEMBER 2000, WHICH HER MAJESTY‘S GOVERNMENT IS 
SUBMITTING AS EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY LORD PENROSE ¶ 6.2.5 (2001)). 
 273. Id. (citing Press Release, British Bankers‘ Ass‘n, BBA/LIBA Response to 
Consultation Paper 97 – The Integrated Prudential Sourcebook (Jan. 17, 2002)).  To the 
extent that the events giving rise to these criticisms (and the Equitable Life affair) transpired 
within the first few years of the FSA‘s existence, however, one might reasonably attribute 
any coordination problems to the growing pains (i.e. start-up costs) of a new and 
institutionally complex regulator. 
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go undetected.
274
  Given its record in this respect, it seems at the very least 
possible that the information necessary to fully evaluate the risks associated 
with the growth, proliferation, and complexity of OTC derivatives markets 
may not have been gathered, aggregated, analyzed, and/or directed to the 
FSA personnel capable of evaluating the probability and potential impact 
of these risks and, thereafter, initiating appropriate regulatory action.  
Indeed, while the FSA was not responsible under E.U. securities laws for 
the supervision of AIGFP, poor coordination—both internally and with 
AIGFP‘s French regulators—seems a likely (if only partial) explanation for 
why its USD$500 billion London-based CDS operations did not attract 
greater regulatory scrutiny.  Ultimately, however, it is difficult to assess 
whether poor coordination was to blame for the FSA‘s failure to effectively 
monitor the operations of AIGFP or, more broadly, the extent to which it 
shaped the FSA‘s non-interventionist approach toward the regulation of 
OTC derivatives markets.
275
  Moreover, coordination problems likely 
represent at best only one piece of a much larger puzzle. 
B. Competing Regulatory Objectives 
A potentially more compelling explanation for the FSA‘s approach 
toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets is that it was a product of 
the regulator‘s attempt to balance competing regulatory objectives.  As the 
FSA itself acknowledges, its broad and complex remit invariably generates 
situations in which its statutory objectives will come into conflict with one 
another.
276
  As has already been observed, these statutory objectives are to 
maintain market confidence, promote public awareness, secure consumer 
protection, and reduce financial crime.  Beneath these objectives, however, 
resides a second tier of regulatory objectives consisting of principles of 
good regulation, strategic aims, and outcomes that the FSA is expected to 
consider in pursuing its statutory mandate. 
It is within this second tier that potential conflicts arise between the 
FSA‘s statutory objectives and the objectives of promoting efficient and 
internationally competitive financial markets.  The principles of good 
regulation articulated in the FSMA mandate, for example, that the FSA 
discharge its functions with regard to, amongst other matters:  (1) the 
desirability of facilitating innovation, (2) maintaining the competitive 
 
 274. See FSA, Lessons Learned Review of the Supervision of Northern Rock PLC During 
the Period 1 January 2005 to 9 August 2007: Executive Summary at 4-7 (March 2008) 
[hereinafter Executive Summary] (identifying, inter alia, (1) poor allocation of expertise, (2) 
lack of proper training for supervisory personnel, and (3) lack of expertise in prudential 
banking and financial analysis as contributing factors). 
 275. The author‘s request to interview FSA personnel was refused. 
 276. FSA, How We Evaluate Our Performance – The Outcomes Performance Report 
and Developments in Our Approach Since 2002, at 9 (2007). 
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position of the U.K. within financial services and markets, (3) minimizing 
adverse effects on competition, and (4) the desirability of facilitating 
competition between those subject to FSA regulation.
277
  The FSA has 
further identified as strategic aims:  (1) promoting efficient, orderly, and 
fair markets, and (2) improving its business capability and effectiveness.
278
  
Amongst the FSA‘s desired outcomes flowing from these strategic aims are 
that (1) the U.K. be internationally attractive, and (2) the FSA be easy to do 
business with.
279
  Indeed, the FSA has historically taken great pains to 
communicate to the marketplace that its general approach is to regulate in a 
way which supports competition and innovation with financial markets—
with the promotion of competition, minimizing regulatory costs, making 
life easier for regulated actors, and restraint in regulatory intervention 
permeating FSA guidance and other literature prior to the global financial 
crisis.
280
  This approach should not ultimately be surprising given that, as 
has already been observed, the enactment of the FSMA, and with it the 
migration toward integrated regulation, was largely motivated by concerns 
regarding the international competitiveness of U.K. financial markets. 
The trends toward globalization and integration within financial 
markets over the past several decades have sparked intense international 
competition within the financial services industry.  This competition has 
fueled a transatlantic rivalry between New York and London for supremacy 
in the lucrative markets for investment banking, sales, and trading services.  
While New York has long been acknowledged as the global leader in these 
markets, recent years have seen Europe—and London in particular—attract 
a larger share of global investment banking revenues.
281
  Over this period, 
London has gained particular momentum in the markets for new public 
issuances of equity and debt and, importantly, the structuring of OTC 
derivative transactions.
282
  As of 2006, Europe (with London as its primary 
trading hub) accounted for 56% of the estimated USD$52 billion in global 
investment banking revenues derived from OTC derivatives transactions.
283
  
Moreover, the increasing inter-relatedness of derivative and cash markets 
has conferred upon London an important strategic advantage relative to 
 
 277. FSMA, § 2(3)(d), (e), (f) & (g). 
 278. FSA, Outcomes Performance Report, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Aims/Performance/opr/index.shtml (last updated Apr. 
28, 2010). 
 279. Id. 
 280. See, e.g., FSA, Better Regulation Action Plan 5 (Dec. 2005), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/better_regulation.pdf (outlining how, inter alia, removing 
barriers, and regulating less where possible would improve competition and minimize 
regulatory costs). 
 281. Bloomberg Report, supra note 62, at 10-13. 
 282. Id. at 54. 
 283. Id. at 13. 
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New York.
284
 
London‘s ascendancy within the global financial services industry has 
been largely attributed to the relative attractiveness of the U.K.‘s legal and 
regulatory environment.  Specifically, the FSA‘s integrated regulatory 
framework, responsiveness, flexibility, and accountability have been 
identified as key competitive advantages.
285
  Viewed from this perspective, 
the risks associated with the growth, proliferation, and complexity of OTC 
derivatives markets generated an acute conflict between the FSA‘s 
regulatory objectives—any unilateral deviation from its non-interventionist 
approach in order to maintain market confidence, protect consumers, and/or 
reduce financial crime within OTC derivatives markets would potentially 
jeopardize the U.K.‘s global competitiveness.  Maintaining its non-
interventionist approach can thus be explained as the by-product of the 
FSA‘s attempt to balance these competing objectives.  Perhaps most 
disconcerting in this respect is the lack of transparency accompanying this 
process—the FSA‘s integrated structure having effectively driven this 
balancing act underground.  That this balancing act may (with the benefit 
of hindsight) have proven socially sub-optimal
286
 ultimately only provides 
further fodder for critics of integrated regulation. 
The nature of the conflict between the FSA‘s regulatory objectives 
brings to mind Simon Johnston‘s thesis respecting the ―soft‖ capture of the 
U.S. Congress and financial regulators by the U.S. banking industry.  The 
principles of good regulation, strategic aims, and outcomes described above 
are infused with language designed to emphasize the importance of 
minimizing the impact of FSA regulation on the operation of financial 
markets.  This language reflects what was—prior to the crisis—a broader 
prevailing sentiment that unencumbered markets represented the optimal 
mechanisms for allocating societal resources.  It can hardly be surprising, 
therefore, that FSA policy reflected this free market ethos with respect to, 
inter alia, the regulation of OTC derivatives markets.  Indeed, the potential 
for ―soft‖ capture may have been exacerbated in the case of the FSA by its 
funding model (which, as described above, relies on industry levies) and 
adherence to a ―more principles-based‖ regulatory philosophy (which 
contemplates a high level of interaction and cooperation between the FSA 
and regulated actors).
287
 
 
 284. Id. at 54. 
 285. Id. at ii, 10, 12, 17, 54, 65, 80-81 & 86. 
 286. Which, it must be acknowledged, has not yet been established. 
 287. See Weber, supra note 197, at 104 and Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial 
Innovation: A More Principles-based Alternative?, 5 Brook. J. of Corp., Fin. & Com. L. 
(forthcoming 2011) (discussing how ―more principles-based‖ regulatory regimes may be 
susceptible to capture). 
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C. Incentive Problems:  National Regulation, Global Markets 
Prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, few would have argued 
that the U.K. had not reaped significant benefits—in the form of, inter alia, 
enhanced employment, personal and business incomes and, ultimately, tax 
revenues
288
—from the FSA‘s non-interventionist approach toward the 
regulation of OTC derivatives markets.  At the same time, however, as the 
effects of the crisis sent ripples through the global economy, the realization 
of many of the systemic risks associated with OTC derivatives imposed 
substantial costs on market participants and, ultimately, taxpayers residing 
outside the U.K.  This negative externality exposes a third, and potentially 
powerful, explanation for the FSA‘s approach:  namely, that national 
regulators are unlikely to possess sufficient incentives to take unilateral 
action to address systemic risks within global financial markets.  More 
specifically, while regulators will invariably incur significant direct
289
 and 
indirect
290
 costs when attempting to address systemic risks, the benefits 
thereby generated are likely to be negligible insofar as the jurisdiction will 
still be exposed to negative externalities stemming from the failure of 
regulators in other jurisdictions to adopt equivalent measures.
291
  From the 
perspective of national financial regulators, therefore, systemic risk 
regulation represents a bundle of potentially significant costs without the 
guarantee of any corresponding benefits.  Viewed in this light, it is possible 
to see how the FSA may have reasonably dismissed unilateral intervention 
to ameliorate systemic risks within OTC derivatives markets—or to address 
regulatory gaps such as those exploited by AIGFP—as being 
fundamentally unappealing from a cost-benefit perspective.
292
 
D. The Inherent Limitations of Financial Regulation 
While incentive problems and the challenge of balancing competing 
regulatory objectives provide compelling explanations for the FSA‘s 
adoption of a non-interventionist approach toward the regulation of OTC 
 
 288. See Bloomberg Report, supra note 62 (describing some of the benefits that accrued 
to the U.K. as a result of the country‘s regulatory regime). 
 289. Stemming from, for example, the promulgation, monitoring, and enforcement of 
systemic risk regulation. 
 290. Stemming from, for example, the marginal flight of business, and capital from the 
jurisdiction. 
 291. Simultaneously, any positive spillovers will flow at least in part to other 
jurisdictions. 
 292. Although in fairness to the FSA, the incentive problems manifested within this cost-
benefit calculus were arguably compounded by a degree of ambiguity surrounding the 
extent to which the FSA had abrogated responsibility for systemic risk regulation to both the 
Bank of England and E.U. policymakers. 
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derivatives markets, there exists a potentially far more fundamental—and 
troubling—explanation.  Modern financial markets are extremely complex.  
The frequency and complexity of interactions within and between financial 
markets, to say nothing of the nature and pace of change within these 
markets, make the timely and comprehensive evaluation of potential risks 
an exceedingly difficult, if not entirely unrealistic, prospect.  Within such 
an environment, it is all but inevitable that regulators will be called upon to 
evaluate the probability and potential impact of a myriad of risks armed 
with imperfect information and, accordingly, deploy cognitive frameworks 
which exhibit elements of bounded rationality. 
The current global financial crisis provides a vivid illustration of the 
informational challenges posed by the dynamism and complexity of 
modern financial markets.  It is certainly the case that many of the factors 
which contributed to the onset and perniciousness of the crisis—including 
global trade imbalances, the growth and systemic importance of 
derivatives/securitization markets, increasing use of leverage, and evolving 
forms of maturity transformation
293
—were more or less readily observable.  
Other factors, however—such as the flaws within the structure of 
derivatives markets and their pricing, over-reliance on sophisticated 
quantitative techniques for measuring and managing risk, hardwired 
procyclicality, the recycling of risk within the financial system, and the 
broader systemic implications of a liquidity crisis within wholesale credit 
markets
294
—were arguably much less apparent, or at the very least 
contestable, until fairly late in the day.  Furthermore, even in the 
circumstance where all relevant information was sufficiently observable ex 
ante, accurately predicting the probability, impact, and timing of the 
confluence of these factors would have still required a truly sophisticated 
understanding of the complex interactions within and between financial 
markets.  Viewed from this perspective, it seems hardly surprising that the 
failure to initially identify, and then accurately assess the probability and 
likely impact
295
 of the growing systemic risks—indeed, in thinking that 
many of these factors were actually enhancing systemic resiliency
296
—was 
 
 293. See FSA, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis 
11-22 (March 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf 
[hereinafter Turner Review] (detailing the causes of the recent financial crisis). 
 294. Id. at 11-23. 
 295. See FSA, Memorandum to the Treasury Committee, Recent Turbulence in Global 
Financial Markets and Northern Rock‟s Liquidity Crisis 2 (Oct. 9, 2007) (showing that as of 
January 2007, for example, while the FSA believed that a ―market correction was likely,‖ it 
―attached a very low probability to a tightening of the speed, duration, and scale‖ which 
eventually occurred). 
 296. IMF, Global Financial Stability Report 51 (2006) (―The dispersion of credit risk by 
banks to a broader and more diverse set of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on 
their balance sheets, has helped make the banking and overall financial system more 
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a global one.
297
  That this failure was not only one of regulators but also 
one of markets (as evidenced by, inter alia, the failure of pre-crisis CDS 
spreads to accurately reflect systemic risks)
298
 only further emphasizes the 
informational challenges posed within modern financial markets. 
Historically, the informational challenges encountered within modern 
financial markets have been exacerbated within OTC derivatives markets 
by virtue of their opacity and the rapidity with which their counterparty 
exposures are capable of changing.
299
  These factors have combined to 
render it even more difficult for regulators to identify and evaluate potential 
risks within OTC derivatives markets.  Nevertheless, the FSA, to its credit, 
was in fact able to identify a number of the risks associated with the 
growth, proliferation, and complexity of OTC derivatives markets prior to 
the onset of the crisis.  More specifically, successive FSA Annual Reports 
and Financial Risk Outlooks identified, inter alia (1) the growth of credit 
derivatives markets;
300
 (2) the backlog of confirmations and other 
operational risk issues within OTC derivatives markets;
301
 and (3) the 
complexity of OTC derivatives and attendant risk management problems as 
issues of concern.
302
  Ultimately, however, the FSA failed both to foresee 
the role that OTC derivatives would play in the global financial crisis and 
to attach a sufficiently high probability and/or potential impact to their 
attendant risks so as justify the allocation of resources toward the 
implementation of rules designed to impose greater transparency, prevent 
market abuse, or mitigate potential systemic risks.
303
  It must be 
remembered, however, that all of this is apparent only with the benefit of 
hindsight.  Accordingly, rather than viewing these failures as such, it may 
be more appropriate to view them (at least in part) as reflecting the 
complexity of modern financial markets, the informational challenges 
 
resilient.‖). 
 297. See Turner Review, supra note 293, at 85 (discussing the international failure to 
identify systemic risks). 
 298. Id. at 46, 109.  In fact, CDS spreads within the financial services sector suggested 
that risks were at historically low levels.  Indeed, it now seems that CDS prices—much like 
the insurance markets they so closely resemble—may systemically understate risks in 
upswings and overstate risks in downswings. 
 299. See Henry Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Information Failure and 
the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L. J. 1457, 1462-63 (1993) 
(discussing the difficulties posed to the financial system by the informational failures within 
banks and regulatory agencies); Wilmarth, supra note 35, at 467 (discussing the difficulties 
regulators face in monitoring OTC markets, which are particularly opaque and change 
rapidly). 
 300. FSA, Annual Reports (2003-2006); FSA, Financial Risk Outlooks (2002-2006). 
 301. FSA, Financial Risk Outlooks (2005-2007); FSA, Annual Reports (2003-2007). 
 302. FSA, Financial Risk Outlooks (2002-2007). 
 303. Although in this final respect, it must be acknowledged that the FSA shared 
responsibility with the Bank of England. 
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posed thereby and, ultimately, the inherent limits of financial regulation. 
There remains one final question: What lessons can policymakers in 
the U.S. and other jurisdictions draw from these potential explanations in 
terms of the optimal structure of financial regulation?  First, as many 
critics of integrated regulation have suggested, the theoretical advantages 
of integrated regulation in terms of enhanced coordination may prove 
exceedingly difficult to operationalize.  At the same time, as amply 
illustrated by the U.S. example, it must be acknowledged that barriers to 
effective coordination will likely exist within all institutional models.  To 
the extent that the elimination of these barriers may prove less costly within 
the context of a single, integrated regulator with a unified management 
structure, integrated regulation as a whole may still represent a superior (if 
pareto-inferior) model.  Ultimately, however, these potential savings must 
be weighed against the switching costs associating with any shift toward 
greater integration.  Second, the results of the FSA‘s attempt to balance 
competing regulatory objectives lend credence to concerns that integrated 
regulation may promote non-transparent decision-making processes which 
could result in the sub-optimal balancing—or even the outright 
subordination—of regulatory objectives.  Inferentially, the FSA‘s 
experience would also appear to provide a modicum of support for 
concerns regarding the vulnerability of integrated regulators to public 
choice and regulatory capture problems.  The FSA‘s experience in these 
regards thus serves to illuminate the potential desirability of proposals, 
such as those currently being pursued by the Conservative government in 
the U.K, which would see responsibility for prudential regulation, 
consumer protection, and competition split between separate specialist 
regulators.
304
  Third, the incentive problems faced by national regulators 
(which are ultimately deserving of a degree of attention which is beyond 
the scope of this paper) suggest that the benefits of integration—especially 
in terms of systemic risk (macro-prudential) regulation—may be the 
greatest if pursued at the supranational rather than the national level.  This 
explanation, along with the failures of inter-jurisdictional regulatory 
coordination at the heart of the AIG debacle, bolsters the case for the 
development of a more robust global regulatory architecture. 
Perhaps the most difficult potential explanation from which to derive 
lessons is that there may exist inherent limits on the potential efficacy of 
regulation within the context of highly complex and dynamic global 
financial markets.  On one level, the FSA‘s integrated ―risk-based‖ 
approach to regulation, premised on evaluating the impact and probability 
of risks as a means of prioritizing them and allocating resources, seems a 
 
 304. See Enrich & Norman, supra note 17 (describing the elimination of the FSA and the 
consolidation of power within the Bank of England).  
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prudent course of action within such an environment.  On another level, 
however, and as amply illustrated by the global financial crisis, the 
complexity and rapid pace of change within modern financial markets 
(along with our imperfect understanding of them) will almost inevitably 
undermine our attempts to accurately assess the probability and likely 
impact of potential risks.  That the FSA has perhaps not fully grasped this 
possibility is evidenced by its recent statement that the crisis was ―the 
crystallization of a low-probability, high-impact risk.‖
305
  Ultimately, it 
may not have been that the crisis was the crystallization of a low-
probability risk, but rather that the FSA—along with other regulators and 
market participants—fundamentally misjudged its probability.  In this light, 
perhaps the most important lesson stemming from the complexity and 
dynamism of modern financial markets is that we need to recalibrate our 
expectations of what financial regulation—irrespective of its institutional 
structure—is capable of achieving.  As the FSA has long acknowledged, 
there will always be failures and it would be both impossible and, in any 
event, undesirable to seek to eliminate all risk from within financial 
markets. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The global financial crisis has prompted policymakers on both sides of 
the Atlantic to question their previous approaches toward financial 
regulation.  The purpose of this paper has been to address a number of 
these questions as they relate to the efficiency and overall desirability of 
integrated regulation relative to competing institutional models, ultimately 
with a view to better understanding the optimal structure of financial 
regulation.  More specifically, this paper has explored why, despite the 
numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, the U.K. FSA 
adopted a non-interventionist regulatory regime governing OTC derivatives 
markets that was both functionally equivalent to the fractured U.S. regime 
and, arguably, socially suboptimal.  There can be little doubt that the FSA 
has been able to translate into practice many of the theoretical strengths of 
integrated regulation.  At the same time, however, the experience of the 
FSA has exposed some potential weaknesses of integrated regulation in 
terms of (1) poor coordination; (2) the sub-optimal balancing of competing 
regulatory objectives; (3) incentive problems for national regulators; and 
(4) the inherent limitations of regulation within the context of highly 
complex and dynamic global financial markets.  Insofar as these potential 
weaknesses can be observed across all institutional models, the foregoing 
exploration manifest important lessons for those who view identifying the 
 
 305. Executive Summary, supra note 274, at 1. 
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optimal structure of regulation as key to preventing the next financial crisis.  
Does the institutional structure of financial regulation matter?  Based on 
the foregoing examination, the optimistic answer, it would appear, is only 
to a point. 
